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Chapter 1
Introduction
Executive compensation has been a central point of debates for the past 20 years, both in the
academic circle and in Wall Street Journal. Have shareholders paid too much to the CEOs, or are
the pay packages necessary for recruiting and keeping managerial talents? Are the structures of
the pay packages reasonable, or are the compensation packages designed the way they are simply
to facilitate more manipulation? The end to the debate between perspectives of "rent-seeking1"
(i.e., executives are always stealing shareholdersmoney away) ands "e¢ cient contracting2" (i.e.,
executive pays are set with economic rationales by their shareholders) does not appear to be
coming any time soon. The thesis contributes to this debate by rst identifying rms whose
CEOs are more optimisitic about their rmsprospects are more likely to experience crashes in
stock prices. Subsquently in Chapter 3 and 4, the thesis aims to o¤er economic explanations for
current compensation structures.
Chapter 2, "CEO Optimism and Stock Crashes," examines what happens when CEOs
hold on to more company equities than they need to. Standard agency theory assumes a conict
of interests in the risk dimension as illustrated in the subsequent two chapters. Specically,
1Bebchuk and Frieds (2007) thought provoking book is often cited for this view.
2Edmans and Gabaix (2009) o¤er a comprehensive review of potential economic explanations on di¤erent
aspects of CEO pays.
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executives are more risk-averse to their own rmsequities because their wealth is tied signi-
cantly to the rm and they cannot hedge against the risk e¤ectively like general shareholders.
In that way, executives should unwind their positions in the company whenever they can. Why
do executives keep on holding the stock and options when they do not need to? The chapter
examines several potential reasons. In the end I conclude that these CEOs who choose to hold
more equities are blindly optimistic about their rmsprospects. A measure of executive op-
timism is constructed based on the relative mix of restricted and unrestricted incentives. The
measure shows that CEOs with higher optimistic ratios (i.e. a ratio of unrestricted incentive
pay to total incentive pay) are more likely to spend more on R&D projects, but are less e¤ective
in innovation outputs, and their rms are more likely to experience stock price crashes. The
results are robust to numerous empirical specications and outperform existing predictors of
stock price crashes.
In Chapter 3, "How Important are Risk Taking Incentive in Executive Compensation?"
we consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking incentives
in addition to e¤ort incentives. This proposed model recognizes the fact that managers can be
equally important in their e¤ort decisions and their project choices, which essentially results in a
dual-agency problem. A risk-averse CEO will typically require extra incentives to motivate him
to assume high-risk-high-return projects preferred by risk-neutral shareholders. We calibrate the
model to data on 727 CEOs and show that it can explain observed contracts much better than
the standard model without risk-taking incentives. The optimal contract predicted by our model
protects the CEO from losses for bad outcomes, is convex for medium outcomes, and concave for
good outcomes. Moreover, a new measure of risk-taking (dis)incentives is proposed to measure
the required probability an additional risky project must exceed in order to be adopted by the
CEO. The median risk avoidance in our sample is 1.25 for a risk-aversion parameter of 2. Hence,
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the median CEO will adopt a project that increases rm risk by one percentage point if and
only if it increases rm value by at least 1.25%.
Chapter 4, "Should Options be Issued in the Money? Evidence fromModel Calibrations
with Risk-Taking Incentives," investigates the optimal structure of CEO compensation contracts
by specically employing commonly used compensation mechanisms: xed salary, stock, and op-
tions. We take the same model in Chapter 3 to individual CEO data and it turns out that the
proposed model can explain observed compensation practice surprisingly well. In particular,
it justies large option holdings and high base salaries. We also show that the optimal com-
pensation structure looks strikingly di¤erent from observed contracts. Specically the optimal
compensation package should replace at-the-money options and stocks by in-the-money options.
If the tax discrimination against in-the-money options are taken into account, the model is then
consistent with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options.
3
 
Chapter 2
CEO Optimism and Stock Price Crashes
Using Execucomp data from 1992 to 2009, we derive an optimistic ratio measure based on
executives relative portfolio compositions in unrestricted and restricted parts and show that
CEO optimistic ratios are positively and signcantly related to rm-specic price crash risk.
Optimistic CEOs tend to spend more on R&D projects while producing less innovation output
in return. The paper provides new evidence that CEO personal portfolio decisions are related
to rm performance. The results are robust to various empirical specications and various
previously identied factors of stock price crash risk.
2.1 Introduction
Standard agency theory suggests equity pay as one of the mechanisms to align the interests
of executives and shareholders. However, executives as risk averse agents have incentives to
unwind their positions to diversify as they value their equity portfolios less than plain cash. In
particular, Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2011) estimate that CEOs value their options with
a 20% - 60% discount depending on parameter values. Why do they not unwind from their
rm-related portfolio when they can legally do so? In this article, we attempt to analyze why
5
CEOs hold their equities longer than they should and construct a measure of executive optimism
and show that CEOs with higher optimistic ratios, a ratio of unrestricted incentive pay to total
incentive pay, are more likely to experience price crashes on their rms. Optimistic CEOs are
also slightly more likely to spend more on R&D projects, but are less e¤ective in innovation
outputs. However, the relationship between CEO optimism and crashes is not due to the less
e¢ cient spending on R&D projects. The results are robust to various controls and empirical
specications.
To motivate the measure of managerial optimism, we attempt to distinguish from
several potential reasons why CEOs keep on holding their equities. The rst evident reason is
that CEOs possess private information on the rms, and their portfolio decisions reect that
their rms are undervalued. When the company enters a promising project whose value is most
likely correctly estimated by the private information of executives, the benets of potential
returns can outweigh the cost of bearing more rm-specic risk1. In this case, CEO voluntary
ownership will denote better subsequent performance and less incidents of crashes. On the
contrary, the CEOs may be simply too optimistic on the outlook of the rm; in this case, where
CEO voluntary ownership will indicate an over-estimation of subjective rm value accompanied
by an under-estimation of incidents of crashes. Yet another possible explanation that is popular
in market gossips but rather not popular in academic circles is that CEOs are in fact risk loving
in that they favor rm-specic risk to diversication. In this case, CEO voluntary ownership will
be related to both incidents of crashes and booms as the distribution of return will be atter.
We evaluate all the hypotheses above and argue that CEOs who hold more equities than they
need are optimistic. The reason is that CEOs who hold their equities longer than they should
1Among other insider trading papers, Ali, Wei, and Zhou (2011) showed that when rms face re sales by
mutual funds, their insiders can make a prot in their trading patterns. In addition, Henderson (2011) provides
evidence that CEOs do make a prot in insider trading activities, and the board takes it into account when setting
pays.
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indicate more risk in price crashes and less e¢ ciency in R&D spendings.
The paper is directly related to the literature on stock crashes in that we o¤er arguably a
more direct and robust explanation to rm-specic stock price crashes: CEO optimism. Previous
literature has shown that rm-specic crash risk is related to heterogeneous investor beliefs
(Chen, Hong, and Stein 2001), transparency of nancial reports (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian
2009), and incentive alignment of CFOs (Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011). In particular, Kim, Li,
and Zhang (2011) argue that the sensitivities of CFOsoption portfolio value to stock prices
are positively related to crash risks. The reason is that CFOs who have more incentives are
more likely to manipulate stock prices; hence bad news are likely clustered together to induce
price crashes. We argue that earning management is merely one of the many channels that
top executives can do to manipulate stock prices to induce stock crashes. While incentives
for CFOs matter more in earnings management behaviors (Jiang, Petroni, and Wang 2010,
Chava and Purnanandam 2010), incentives for CEOs, as the main decision maker of the rm,
arguably matter more in an array of rm policies, such as investment choices (Coles, Daniel,
Naveen 2006), leverage ratio, and cash balances (Chava and Purnanandam 2010). These rm
policies can also be related to uncertainty and transparency of the rm and result in rm-
specic crashes. Our study incorporates both the incentive alignment measures proposed by
the previous literature and the optmistic ratios for both CEOs and CFOs and show that CEO
personal portfolio decisions play a more signicant and lasting role in price crashes.
Several studies have examined the static mixture of unrestricted and restricted equity
holdings of executives. Core and Guay (2002) arguably start the discussion by classifying the
existing executive option holdings into exercisable ones and unexercisable ones, and use the
information to estimate relative maturities of di¤erent options in the portfolio. Our measure
of optimism takes the analogy from the over-condence index proposed by Malmendier and
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Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008), in which the optimism ratio also measures the extent to which the
executives fail to unwind their positions in the rms when they should. Closely related to our
paper, Campbell et al. (2011) and Otto (2011) propose another measure of CEO optimism by
examining the dynamic CEO option exercising and stock purchasing behaviors. The measure
is most similar to the optimism ratio that we propose, but the ratio requires option exercis-
ing/stock purchasing data. Suppose an executive stays put by tying his entire wealth to the
rm, the executive cannot be coded according to their algorithm. Also related to our measure
are discretion ratio (Tumarkin (2010)) and duration measure (Gopalan, Milbourn, Sung, Thakor
(2011)). These ratios share the same virtues with optimism ratio by calculating the percentage
of unrestricted equity holdings in the entire incentive pay, but none of the papers relates the
ratio of unrestricted and restricted equity mix to stock price crashes.
The CEO overcondence/optimism literature after Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b)
has evolved into two strands. One strand argues that CEO overcondence results in excessive
risk-taking behaviors that are detrimental to the rms. Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b,
2008) nd that overcondent CEOs are involved in more value-decreasing investments. Ben-
David, Graham, and Harvey (2011) show that managerial miscalibration, which is a standard
measure of overcondence, is related to overvaluing cash ows and usage of longer term of
debts. Hribar and Yang (2011) also show that overcondent CEOs tend to overstate rm earn-
ings forecasts. Another strand of literature on overcondence argues that whereas excessive
CEO overcondence may be detrimental to the rms, a moderate value of CEO optimism may
result in rst-best investment decisions (Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 2011, Hirshleifer, Low,
and Teoh 2010, Campbell et al. 2011). Our paper contributes to the literature by providing
evidence that CEO optismism can also result in adverse events such as stock price crashes.
Generally, the paper is also related to the general strand of literature linking both
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CEO personal traits and incentives to corporate performance and policy making. Traditional
executive compensation research focuses on the so-called pay-performance relationship, which
stems from the classic paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990) that essentially askes the following
question: how much incentives should be provided to CEOs to obtain the desired results asked
by shareholders? In recent research, there have been an increasing number of studies that
document the relationship between CEO personal traits and corporate policies in general. The
paper contributes to the general literature in that it combines both aspects of recent research:
incentives and personal traitsdened as managerial portfolio decisions surrounding incentives2.
We show that, albeit in a limited setting of predicting price crashes, CEOs personal traits
deserve more attention.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the construction
of the data. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 follows with some additional
robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Data Construction
We consider all ExecuComp rms with both CEO and CFO compensation data available from
scal year 1992 to 2009. We then match our data with Compustat and CRSP return data.
We exclude data with missing returns in CRSP and missing nancials in Compustat. The nal
sample consists of 2,874 unique rms, 18,482 rm-year observations with both CEO and CFO
compensation data available.
2Bertrand and Schoar (2003) started the discussion by imposing a managerial xed e¤ect in rm performance.
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2.2.1 Optimism Ratio
We construct the portfolio holdings of all the executives in ExecuComp. Following Core and
Guay (2002), we estimate the option portfolio and separate the option holdings into three cate-
gories: exercisable, unexercisable, and newly issued. As granted options typically come with 3-5
years of vesting periods3, we can safely assume that newly granted options are unexercisable.
We then aggregate the option portfolios by executives and the coresponding option metrics (i.e.,
Black-Scholes values, deltas, and vegas). To construct our optimism ratio which measures the
extent of executive voluntary incentives tied to the company, we take the ratio of exercisable
option delta to total option delta in his portfolio. Specically, the optimism ratio is calculated
as follows:
Optimism Ratio =
Exercisable Option Incentives
Total Option Incentives
=
deltaexercisable options
deltatotal options
(2.2.1)
where delta is the dollar increase in the managers wealth per percentage point increase
in stock prices. The reason why we use deltas as the benchmark is that deltas provide a
convenient way to aggregate di¤erent option data4. The optimism ratio measures the extent to
which executives voluntarily choose to maintain exposures in the rms that they manage. We
nd that most of the CEOs have an optimism ratio higher than 0 because most CEOs keep
part of their options unexercised. As shown in Table 1, the average (median) optimism ratio
is 0.49 (0.54) for CEOs, and 0.42 (0.43) for CFOs. The ratio exhibits a uniform distribution.
The distributions are largely invariant across all subsamples even when the sample counts for
innovation variables are greatly reduced as the data are only available up to year 2006.5
3According to the calculation of Gopalan et al. (2011), 80% of stock grants come with 35 years of vesting
period, whereas 85% of option grants come with 35 years of vesting periods.
4We also construct a more naive measure of optimism by dividing the number of exercisable options by total
number of options. The results are basically identical to the results with our main measure of executive optimism.
5Adding to the two-year time lag convention, only compensation data ranging from scal year 1992 to year
2002 are available for the subsample analysis.
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To further examine the composition of the voluntary holdings, we construct alternative
forms of measures of CEO optimism using stock holding information and aggregate the deltas
of exercisable options and unrestricted stock to construct a portfolio-wide optimism ratio:
Optimism Ratio (Stock) =
Exercisable Stock Incentives
Total Stock Incentives
=
deltaunrestricted stock
deltatotal stock
(2.2.2)
Optimism Ratio (Portfolio) =
Exercisable Incentives
Total Incentives
(2.2.3)
=
deltaexercisable options + deltaunrestricted stock
deltatotal options + deltatotal stock
(2.2.4)
The average (median) stock optimism ratio is 0.84 (1.00) for CEOs and 0.76 (1.00)
for CFOs, suggesting that CEOs and CFOs do not unwind their portfolios by selling stocks
in general. That also contributes to the fact that the portfolio optimism ratio for the average
(median) CEO is 0.66 (0.72). Figure 1 shows the distribution of CEO and CFO optimism
ratios, respectively. Interestingly, CEOs seem to hold on to the stock more compared to options.
More than half of the executives have their entire stock portfolio unrestricted, whereas only
approximately 10% of the CEOs choose to do so with options, suggesting a signicant di¤erence
in treatments of stock and options.
We use the SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) reform to further exploit why CEOs choose
to exercise options rather than sell stock. The argument is that while on the tax front, stock
sales and option exercises are treated the same6. Options are only reported in footnotes before
the 2002, are relatively less transparent than stocks. In Figure 2, we separate the samples into
6Both are subject to capital gain taxes.
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pre-2002 sample and after-2002 sample, the striking di¤erence is that the optimism ratio is much
higher after year 2002. In addition, prior to 2002, no CEO kept their exercisable options intact,
whereas after 2002, 5% of the CEOs maintain their entire exercisable options. The argument is
that SOX reforms make it relatively harder for CEOs to unwind their portfolios by increasing
the real and implicit cost of exercising.
Aside from the main variable of interest, optimism ratio, we also construct a number
of compensation related variables. In light of Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) who document the
possible e¤ect on stock crashes through CFO incentives, we follow their approach and include
their incentive alignment measures in our analysis.
Stock (Option) Alignment =
Deltastock (option)
Deltastock (option) + Fixed Pay
7 (2.2.5)
The incentive alignment measures, which measure the relative proportion of stock or option
versus total pay, are comparable with the evidence of Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011). The average
(median) ratio of stock incentive pay versus total pay is around 13% (4%) for CEOs, and 3%
(1%) for CFOs. The average (median) ratio of option incentive pay versus total pay is around
12% (8%) for CEOs and 8% (5%) for CFOs.8
To further explore the possibility of risk-taking incentives and crashes, we also include
the risk avoidance measure for executives, as suggested by Dittmann and Yu (2011)9. For the
risk avoidance measure, we need an estimation for non-rm wealth of the CEOs and CFOs.
Due to the limited amount of information available in ExecuComp to construct estimate non-
rm executive wealth, we follow a two-step approach to compute the estimations. First, we
7The variable Stock (Option) Alignment is essentially the variable INCENTIVE_STK (INCENTIVE_OPT)
in Kim, Li, Zhang (2011).
8The numbers are comparable with Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011). The reason why our measures are slightly
higher (around 0.5% on average) could be that we only consider stocks with full trading records throughout the
scal year. This is evident by slightly less crash percentage in our sample. (12% compared to 17%)
9This is Chapter 3 in the thesis.
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calculate non-rm wealth by summing all the historical cash inows and outows in salary,
stock sales/purchases/grants, option grants, and exercises in ExecuComp10. The estimates are
more likely biased if the CEO or CFO does not stay in ExecuComp long enough. Thus, we
perform a kitchen sink estimation (untabulated), using the sample with more than a four-year
history in ExecuComp to construct the estimates of predictive regression of non-rm wealth and
then use the predictive regression to estimate non-rm wealth of CEOs. The average utility
adjusted risk-avoidance for CEOs (CFOs) is 2.33 (2.11) indicating that the average CEO (CFO)
will forgo positive NPV projects if these projects generate less than 2.33% (2.11%) of the return
per percentage of volatility.
We also consider the recent literature on pay gaps of CEO versus management team11.
The average short-term pay gap is 0.8 million, and the long-term gap is about 2.1 million. The
vegas and deltas of CEOs and CFOs are also reported in Table 112.
2.2.2 Crash Risk, R&D Expenditure, and Innovation Intensity
Following the stock crash literature, we dene stock crashes as when the rm experiences rm-
specic weekly returns 3.2 standard deviation below the mean rm-specic weekly returns over
the sical year13. The variable Crash is a dummy variable dened as one when the rm experi-
10The approach is essentially identical to the method used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The approach is rst
proposed in Dittmann and Maug (2007) and was used in Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2011), Dittmann, Maug,
and Zhang (2011), Edmans (2011). The data is available for download at Ingolf Dittmanns website.
11Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2009) interpreted the pay gap as the tournament incentive measure. They
show that subsequent performance is better for rms with higher tournament incentives. On the other hand,
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) employ a similar measure "CEO Pay Slice" the relative size of compensation
of CEOs compared with other executive. They show that CPS are negatively related to Tobins Q.
12Both average numbers (deltas, vegas) are slightly larger in our sample than those in Chava and Purnanandam
(2011) since our sample consists of some extreme cases in which CEOs hold a lot of stock and options of the rm
even after we throw away owner-CEOs like Warren Bu¤et of Berkshire Hathaway. Our median, however, is
comparable with Chava and Purnanandam (2011).
13We follow the convention (Kim, Li, Zhang (2011), among others) of dening crashes as 3.2 standard deviations
from the mean to match a 0.1% of tail probability in a normal distribution. Firm-specic returns are dened
following their approach. We take the residuals from regressing weekly raw returns on CRSP value-weighted
returns (with two leads and lag terms) to remove market components in returns. The measure of rm-specic
return can thus be viewed as relative performance against the market. We also conduct a robustness check in
substuting market returns by S&P index returns and CRSP equally weighted returns. The results are virtually
identical.
13
ences one or more crashes in a scal year. In the same manner, we also construct the variable
Boom as a dummy variable dened as one when a rm experiences rm-specic weekly returns
3.2 standard deviations. On average, 12.2% of the rms experience crashes in any given year,
whereas slightly more rms (14.7%) experience booms in any given year, which is reasonable
given that there are more "up" years than "down" years in the sample.
We also calculate three other measures shown to be related to incidents of crashes.
NSCKEW measures the negative conditional return skewness rst proposed by Chen, Hong,
and Stein (2001). DUVOL is the down-to-up volatility measure dened as the ratio of down
week volaility to up week volatility, where down and up weeks are dened when weekly rm-
specic returns are lower or higher than annual means. Both measures represent the asymmetric
nature of return properties. DTURNOVER is the de-trended turnover rates that proxy for the
di¤erences in investor opinions. All distributional variables are comparable with those in the
previous literature.
We use the NBER patent data set that contains detailed information on all U.S. patent
grants by U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) from year 1976 to 2006. We lag the
patent data for two years to allow for time to produce and then match with the ExecuComp
data and crash risk data to evaluate the innovative e¤ectiveness of rms. We use the following
four indicators for innovative intensity of rms: number of patents, adjusted number of patent,
number of citation, and adjusted number of citation. Owing to the data availability, the sample
count is greatly reduced to 5,761 rm-year combinations. R&D intensity is calculated as the
ratio of R&D expenditure to xed capital inputs (proxied by PPENT). Other control variables
are within the norms in the literature.
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2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 Executive Optimism and Stock Crashes
To examine how executive optimism relates to future stock crash events, we begin our analysis
by running the following logistic regression:
logit(Crashi;t+1) = 0+1Optimism Ratio(CEO)i;t+1Optimism Ratio(CFO)i;t+Controlsi;t+"i;t
(2.3.1)
Following the literature on stock crashes, we employ NCSKEW, DUVOL, DTURNOVER as con-
trol variables. NCSKEW measures the persistence of skewness of rm-specic returns. DUVOL
is the down-to-up volatility, which captures the relative information uncertainty in down markets
versus up markets. DTURNOVER, the de-trended turnover rate, proxies for investor hetero-
geneity in which stocks with higher investor heterogeneity more likely su¤er from crashes. We
cluster our standard errors in both rm and year dimensions following Thompson (2011). The
results are provided in Table 3. The positive coe¢ cient on CEO optimism ratio indicates that
crashes are more likely when CEOs are more optimistic about the rms prospects, as suggested
by their portfolio holdings, whereas the optimism ratios of CFOs do not have such predictive
power. The e¤ect is highly signicant across a number of di¤erent specications. As expected in
the literature, higher down-to-up volatility (DUVOL), lower rm-specic returns are associated
with the higher likelihood of stock crashes14. However, NCSKEW and DTURNOVER turn out
to be insignicant or even negatively related with stock crashes. As the e¤ects of optimism per-
sist in all specications we have examined even after adding these NCSKEW and DTURNOVER
variables, we argue that optimism ratios better explain the likelihood of stock crashes than other
variables previously documented as determinants of stock crashes. In untabulated results, we
14The result is di¤erent from that in Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011).
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nd that the marginal e¤ects of the average rm on optimism ratio is 0.036, which is about 6
times as much as all the other explanatory variables in the regression. The marginal e¤ects may
be small, but the e¤ects are much more signicant than other previously identied variables.
We have shown that optimistic CEOs are associated with future stock crashes, suggest-
ing that CEOs do not make these portfolio decisions based on superior information. However,
CEOs could be argued as risk-loving, as opposed the common assumption in the literature.
CEOs simply prefer a risky portfolio to a diversied one. If that is the case, the reason why
optimistic CEOs su¤er from more crashes is that the return distribution is simply atter than
normal for them. Thus, there are more crashes, but there will be also more booms, which we
dene as mirrored events to crashes 3.2 standard deviation above the annual mean. To this
end, we run the same logistic regression but replace the crash dummies with booms. The results
are shown in Table 4.
logit(Boomi;t+1) = 0+1Optimism Ratio(CEO)i;t+1Optimism Ratio(CFO)i;t+Controlsi;t+"i;t
(2.3.2)
Across all specications, the optimism ratios for both CEOs and CFOs turn out to
be insignicant, which suggests that CEOsholdings have no predictive power on future stock
booms. This further conrms the over-condent story and reject the risk-loving story. In
untabulated results, we also regress the same sets of variables on Tobins Q. The coe¢ cient on
optimism ratio is marginally signcant and negative. The evidence also rejects the risk-loving
and superior information story.
Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) argue that sensitivities of CFOsoption portfolio value to
stock prices are positively related to crash risks. To incorporate the arguments, we construct
the incentive alignment measures following Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) and run the logisitic
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regression again using these incentive alignment measures as additional controls. The incentive
alignment ratios15 measures the extent of the interest alignment in equity pay to total pay as
dened in (2.2.5). For completeness, we also include other compensation variables that have
been shown to be related to executive risk-taking behaviors.
Table 5 reports the results of the logistic regression incorporating the incentive align-
ment variables among other compensation variables. Our measures of CEO optimism remain
signicantly positive across all model specications, whereas the incentive alignment measures
are only signicant in one out of the four settings. When CEOs are more optimistic about
the prospects of the rm and opt to keep their wealth inside of the rm instead of beneting
from the potential inside information of the rm, their rms are more likely to crash, and thus
hurting their portfolio values. The results also reject the hypothesis of incentive alignment story
in that rms with more incentive alignments in CFOs are not typically likely to crash. We also
construct estimates of the CEO risk avoidance following the method proposed in Chapter 3. The
coe¢ cient of risk avoidance index is insignicant which echoes our arguments in Chapter 3 that
CEO risk-taking incentives, as a total package, are likely optimally determined as shareholders
do consider risk-taking incentives when designing equity compensation packages.
In Table 6 we turn our attention to alternative specications of optimism ratios. In the
summary statistics in Table 1 along with Figure 1 and 2, we show that CEOs are more likely to
keep their unrestrictive equity holdings in the form of unrestrictive stock rather than exercisable
options. Keeping unrestricted stock in hand appears to be a common practice for CEOs as
more than half of the CEOs have the entire stock holding unrestricted. The results in rst two
columns in Table 6 show that the portfolio decisions in stock sales/purchases have no signicant
predictive power on stock crashes. When CEOs do not exercise their options, the stocks are more
15The stock/option alignment variables are essentially INCENTIVE_STK_CEO, INCENTIVE_OPT_CEO,
INCENTIVE_STK_CFO, and INCENTIVE_OPT_CFO as presented in Kim, Li, and Zhang(2011). In unre-
ported tables, we show that our measure of optimism is not signicantly correlated with the incentive measures.
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likely to crash, whereas the e¤ects are less signicant when CEOs do not sell their unrestricted
stock portfolio. One of the possible explanation is signaling. When top insiders such as CEOs
sell stocks, the market views this as adverse events; thus the CEO portfolio value will drop. As
CEOs cannot unwind their entire portfolio holdings in one shot, which is viewed as an even more
adverse event, the costs of unwinding through stock sales outweigh the benets. At the same
time, options are less transparent (Bebchuk, Fried 2003) and only appear in footnotes before
SOX reforms in year 2002. In addition, the default for most executives is immediately exercising
the options right after the vesting period (when options are in the money). The result as to why
CEOs choose to convey their view of optimism through option exercising but not through stock
selling is not surprising.
To substantiate the view on the relative cost of exercising between stock and options,
we separate our samples to before 2002 and after 2002. If our claim is true, the relationship
between optimism and crashes will be stronger when exercisng costs are relatively low before
2002. The second half of the Table 6 shows that it is the case. Model (3) and Model (5) consider
samples from scal years 1993 to 2001. Model (4) and (6) are run with data from scal years 2003
to 2009. The results conrm that after the SOX reform, as the unwinding costs become higher,
CEOs do not reect their views via their relevant portfolio decisions. However, we acknowledge
that the disappearance of the relationship between optimism and crashes after 2002 can also
be due to the increased transparency in nancial reports (Arping and Sautner 2010) and thus
less bad news will accumulate. In untabulated results, there have been slightly less incidents of
stock crashes after year 2002 (11% compared with around 13% before 2002).
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2.3.2 CEO Optimism and Innovation E¤ectiveness
To extend our analysis, we attempt to explain why CEO optimism is positively related to the
probability of stock crashes. CEOs seem to fail to make good use of their insider knowledge of
their respective rms and make clever personal investment decisions to stay nancially tied to
the rms when it is possible to unwind. One of the possible explanations for this is that CEOs
choose to hold more equities on rms that are overly optimistic about the prospects of the rm
going forward, and they tend to make unwise and risky managerial decisions. We nd some
supports for the claim in Table 7. We nd that CEO optimism is positively (insignicantly)
related to R&D intensity, which is a highly risky investment as argued in Coles, Daniels, and
Naveen (2006), measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to xed assets (PPENT), and is
negatively related to various innovation output variables (led by two years to allow for time to
produce). Whereas the e¤ects of optimism ratios on R&D and innovation are marginal, the
e¤ects on incentive alignment are strong and consistent with the literature: options increase
executives risk appetites while stocks have a mitigating e¤ect16. To evaluate the e¢ ciency
of R&D expenses, we follow the literature in innovation and use patent and citation counts
(adjusted following Acharya, Subramanian (2009)) as proxies for innovation output. Together
with the evidence in the rst two columns in Table 7, we show that optimistic CEOs are slightly
likely to spend more on risky investment in R&D, but are less likely to succeed in doing so,
which re-conrms an over-optimistic story. Consistent with the evidence found in Athanasakou,
Goh, and Ferreira (2011) and Bereskin and Hsu (2010), rms with higher risk-taking incentives
in options for CEOs are less e¢ cient in innovation outputs.
The results from Table 7 suggest some possible omitted variables in our main analysis:
R&D investment and innovation outputs. The less e¢ cient investment decisions by companies
16Interested readers can refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion on the relative value of risk-taking incentives in
stock and options.
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are those that result in crashes. We run the same logistic regression in (2.3.1) by adding R&D
and innovation e¢ ciency variables in Table 8. The results show that R&D and innovation
intensity do inuence incidents of stock crashes, but the e¤ects of optimism ratios remain strong
and do not seem to be diluted by R&D and innovation e¢ ciency.
2.4 Robustness Checks
2.4.1 Sample Selection
Although in Table 2 we show that the rms with both CEO and CFO compensation are not
signicantly di¤erent, our results are still possible to be caused by a sample selection problem in
that we ignore some other factors that may separate rms with both CEO and CFO compensa-
tion data from regular ExecuComp rms. We re-examine the sample by excluding CFOs from
the analysis in Table 9. Our results in Table 9 show otherwise. Although the level of signicance
drops slightly compared with the results in Table 3, the coe¢ cients on CEO optimism remain
positively signicant across all specications.
2.4.2 Incentive Alignment and Optimism Ratio Combined
In Table 3 and subsequently Table 5, we show that optimism ratio outperforms various incentive
alignment measures that have been shown to be related to stock crashes. To further examine
the relative importance of incentive alignment and optimism ratio, we separate the incentive
alignment ratios dened in (2.2.5) into exercisable and unexercisable parts.
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Option Alignment (exercisable) =
Delta(exercisable option)
Delta(total option) + Fixed Pay
(2.4.1)
Option Alignment (unexercisable) =
Delta(unexercisable option)
Delta(total option) + Fixed Pay
(2.4.2)
Stock Alignment (unrestricted) =
Delta(unrestricted stock)
Delta(total stock) + Fixed Pay
(2.4.3)
Stock Alignment (restricted) =
Delta(restricted stock)
Delta(total stock) + Fixed Pay
(2.4.4)
Note that the sum of option (stock) alignment measures of the exercisable and unexer-
cisable (unrestricted and restricted) parts will become the option (stock) alignment measure in
(2.2.5) as in Kim, Li, and Zhang (2011) where they document a signicant relationship between
CFO option alignment measure with stock crashes, but an insignicant relationship in CEO
alignment. Table 10 presents the results obtained from adding these exercisable/unexercisable
alignment measures in logistic regressions. As expected the coe¢ cient on CEO option alignment
incorporating exercisable parts only is still positive and signicant, but interestingly, the coef-
cient for unexercisable CEO alignment measure is signicantly negative, which explains why
CEO option alignment is insignicant in the previous literature. In addition, the e¤ect does not
seem to hold for CFOs. Although we re-conrms that rms with higher CFO options alignment
are more likely to crash, the e¤ects fail to hold when the alignment measures are separated
into exercisable and unexercisable parts. The results re-conrm optimism ratios as a superior
measure for predicting crashes.
2.4.3 Optimal Optimism Ratio
In a closely related paper, Campbell et al. (2011) argue that moderate CEO optimism can
lead to an optimal level of investment, as conrmed by its evidence on CEO exercising behavior
and turnover data. To incorporate the argument, determining if a moderate optimism level can
reduce the incidents of crashes is worthwhile. We separate our samples into three groups: top
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10% of CEO optimism ratio (High), bottom 10% of CEO optimism ratio (Low), and the rest
of the sample is dened as moderate (Mid). The High group consists of samples with CEO
optimism ratios higher than 0.87, and the Low group consists of samples with CEO optimism
ratios of 0, where the CEOs do not have any exercisable stock and option in hand. The summary
statistics for each group is presented in Table 11. The probability of crashes are higher for High
CEO optimism ratio group than the Mid group and Low group. The result is also conrmed
by the return statistics. Panel B, however, conrms Campbell et al. (2011)s theory in optimal
optimism, in which CEOs with moderate optimism ratios are more e¢ cient in innovation mea-
sured by number of patents and citations. However, these rms with moderate CEO optimism
also spend more on their R&D budgets. The relationship between optimism ratio and crashes
persists in the innovation sample as well.
2.4.4 Out-of-the-Money Options
One of the possible explanations why CEOs do not immediately exercise their options once
vested is that the options are in fact, out of the money. Thus there is no benet on exercising
compared with keeping the options in hand. To cope with the concern, we re-do the analysis in
Table 3 by removing the out-of-the-money options in our calculation. The results are shown in
Table 12. The summary statistics are not much di¤erent from that in Table 3, and our results
in Panel B re-conrm our results in Table 3 as well.
2.5 Conclusion
The paper constructs a measure of CEO optimism by comparing the relative proportion of
unexercisable and exercisable incentives that CEOs choose to hold. Optimism ratios, constructed
by exercisable option delta divided by the total option delta, are positively related to future stock
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crashes and the relationship is much stronger and robust than previously identied factors. The
e¤ects are much stronger when option exercising costs are relatively lower before 2002. Our
article provides another dimension in CEO overcondence literature that CEO personal portfolio
decisions do matter in company performance.
Our study follows the recent literature that compares relative importance of CEO and
CFO incentives on corporate policies. While CEOs and CFOs have di¤erent roles to play in their
organizations, their incentives can a¤ect rm policies and performance di¤erently. In particular,
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) provide evidence that the relative importance of CEO and
CFO incentives varies in di¤erent aspects of rm policies CEO incentives are more important
in determining leverage ratios and cash balances, and CFOs incentives are more important in
debt-maturity choices and earning smoothing behaviors. We incorporate both CEO and CFO
incentive alignment measures and optimism ratios and empirically show that CEO optimism is
of rst-order importance in relation to stock price crashes.
One particular reason why CEOs voluntarily hold on to their options that we do not
examine explicitly in this paper is signaling. By holding equities longer than they need to or even
making voluntarily purchases, they signal better prospects of the rm. However, as Malmendier
and Tate (2005a) demonstrate, these portfolio decisions are costly, and option expenses do not
gain that much attention to obtain their signaling e¤ects. As a result, we argue that it is unlikely
that CEOs are simply signaling for future prospects.
We acknowledge that our analysis also su¤ers from the possibility of endogeneity as
in other corporate nance research even after lagging our explanatory variables by one period.
However, we argue that it is unlikely that the causality goes in the opposite direction, as ex-
ecutives sales in the event of crashes are prohibitted by law17, Moreover, if CEOs can predict
17The "Up-Tick" rule dictates that insiders can only sell when stock price is going up. Even though short-term
insider tradings are strictly forbidden by law and corporate charters, there are various ways that executives can
reect their private information: option exercises, voluntary stock purchases, and more recently, hedging. Option
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crashes coming, as rational economic agents, they should try to unwind their portfolios rather
than keep these options in their hands.
An obvious limitation of our construction of optimism ratio is that we cannot make any
reference to CEOs who have no option in their portfolios. However, this inability is relatively
rare in our sample of ExecuComp rms, in which only 743 CFO-years out of the 18,482 rm-year
combinations, 1121 CEO-years out of 23,859 rm-year combinations su¤er from the problem. In
comparison with other optimism/overcondence measures, ours are certainly at a disadvantage
because we lose some part of the information available if CEOs choose to exercise more than
once per year. However, exercising behavior is much more complicated than plain optimism or
overcondence alone18, and our measure of executive optimism can be viewed as an aggregated
snapshot view of exercising behavior.
Another limitation of our study is that we focus on ExecuComp (S&P 1500) rms
similar to many studies which employed the dataset. Possibly the factors of predicting stock
crashes are di¤erent for ExecuComp rms as they are typically larger and face less stock crash
risk. Although whether optimistic CEOs would manage larger or smaller rms remains unclear,
the fact that we employ a sample with relatively less incidents of crashes is, however, biasing
against our results. In addition, even though we consider the pay gap measure in explaining
stock crashes and there is no direct evidence suggesting other managers roles in stock price
crashes, whether other managersincentives are related to price crashes is still an open question.
Our ndings suggest that closer attention should be paid to managerial portfolio de-
cisions in addition to managerial portofolio compositions. Traditionally in the literature, the
attention is on how much incentives are contracted to the executives, without taking how much
exercising is arguably the most convenient way to unwind from rm-specic assests.
18In particular, Klein and Maug (2009) examine di¤erent rationales of CEO exercising behavior. Even
though behavioral concerns accounts for a large part of the reason why CEOs exercise their options, overcon-
dence/optimism alone does not seem to be the only reason.
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incentives executives can get rid of into account. Our ndings have important implications in
combining both aspects in executive compensation: the incentives CEOs receive and the incen-
tives CEOs get rid of. We show that the incentives CEOs should get rid of, not the incentives
CEOs receive, play a more signicant role in stock price crashes. Our results call for further
research on CEO personal portfolio decisions, personal traits and the combination of the two
aspects in CEO pay.
2.6 Tables and Figures
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 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics – Compensation data 
This table presents various descriptive compensation statistics for the sample firms from 
1992 to 2009. Various forms of optimism ratios are defined as the ratio of exercisable 
incentives (deltas) to total incentives. We define Optimism Ratio as the ratio of delta of 
exercisable options to total option deltas. Optimism Ratio (stock) is defined as the ratio of 
number of unrestricted stock to the total number of stock grants, and Optimism Ratio 
(portfolio) is defined as the ratio of total exercisable delta (exercisable options plus 
unrestricted stocks) to total portfolio delta. Stock (Option) Alignment is defined as stock 
(option) delta divided by the sum of stock (option) delta and fixed pay following Kim, Li, 
and Zhang (2011). Non-firm wealth is defined as an estimate of executive non-firm 
wealth that can be calculated for a subset of the executives in ExecuComp. Short-term 
compensation is the total of salary and bonus. Total Expected Wealth is the certainty 
equivalent of the entire portfolio of the sample executives – including non-firm wealth, 
short-term compensation, stock and options assuming CRRA utility for executives with 
risk-aversion parameter 3. Delta measures a CEO’s wealth increase per percentage point 
increase of stock prices. Vega measures by how much CEO wealth changes with a 0.01 
change in volatility. Risk avoidance is defined as utility-adjusted vega divided by 
utility-adjusted delta scaled by firm market value. ST_Gap is the difference of short-term 
pay of CEOs and the average executive (CEO excluded) of the same firm as in Kale, Reis, 
and Venkateswaran (2009). LT_Gap is the long-term pay gap in Kale, Reis, and 
Venkateswaran (2009), which is defined as the difference of long-term pay of CEOs and 
the median executive (CEO excluded) of the same firm. Panel C presents the same 
summary statistics as in Panel A&B, only for samples with innovation and R&D expense 
data available. 
 
Panel A: CEO Compensation Variables 
 Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
Optimism Ratio 0.49 0.30 0.25 0.54 0.75 
Optimism Ratio (Stock) 0.84 0.29 0.78 1.00 1.00 
Optimism Ratio (Portfolio) 0.66 0.26 0.51 0.72 0.87 
Stock Alignment 0.12 0.20 0.01 0.04 0.13 
Option Alignment 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.17 
Non-firm Wealth ($000) 21.51 303.37 2.35 5.21 13.78 
Short-term Compensation ($000) 1.51 2.37 0.63 1.01 1.66 
Total Expected Wealth ($000) 56.92 404.87 5.32 13.49 35.61 
Delta ($000) 828.60 6124.08 74.25 199.34 547.58 
Vega ($000) 101.72 257.29 12.19 37.15 102.45 
Risk Avoidance (Utility) 2.33 2.12 0.98 1.98 3.18 
Risk Avoidance (Nominal) 1.77 1.51 0.72 1.35 2.36 
ST_Gap ($000) 879.12 1995.95 249.62 506.07 954.54 
LT_Gap ($000) 2112.68 8431.75 37.37 591.47 2134.97 
Observations 23859     
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 Panel B: CFO Compensation Variables 
 Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
Optimism Ratio 0.42 0.29 0.17 0.43 0.66 
Optimism Ratio (Stock) 0.76 0.34 0.56 1.00 1.00 
Optimism Ratio (Portfolio) 0.52 0.27 0.32 0.55 0.73 
Stock Alignment 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Option Alignment 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.10 
Non-firm Wealth ($000) 19.75 244.07 2.50 5.53 14.45 
Short-term Compensation ($000) 1.47 2.27 0.63 1.00 1.61 
Total Expected Wealth ($000) 52.93 356.79 5.32 13.28 34.71 
Delta ($000) 91.84 239.48 14.11 35.69 88.58 
Vega ($000) 27.88 70.11 4.11 11.35 28.72 
Risk Avoidance 2.11 1.82 1.01 1.87 2.84 
Observations 18482     
  
 
Panel C: Compensation Variables in Innovation Sample 
CEO Compensation Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
Optimism Ratio 0.47 0.29 0.26 0.52 0.70 
Optimism Ratio (Stock) 0.89 0.25 0.93 1.00 1.00 
Optimism Ratio (Portfolio) 0.64 0.26 0.49 0.69 0.84 
Stock Alignment 0.13 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.12 
Option Alignment 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.19 
Non-firm Wealth ($000) 30.66 503.02 2.27 4.69 12.15 
Short-term Compensation 
($000) 
1.51 2.46 0.61 1.05 1.78 
Total Expected Wealth ($000) 66.27 654.16 5.34 12.89 33.04 
Delta ($000) 1191.61 12558.96 90.96 221.46 589.83 
Vega ($000) 128.87 284.56 17.75 48.52 134.29 
Risk Avoidance (Utility) 2.76 2.12 1.45 2.41 3.62 
CFO Compensation  Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
Optimism Ratio 0.39 0.27 0.16 0.39 0.61 
Optimism Ratio (Stock) 0.86 0.28 0.88 1.00 1.00 
Optimism Ratio (Portfolio) 0.49 0.26 0.28 0.51 0.69 
Stock Alignment 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Option Alignment 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.13 
Non-firm Wealth ($000) 30.66 503.02 2.27 4.69 12.15 
Short-term Compensation 
($000) 
1.51 2.46 0.61 1.05 1.78 
Total Expected Wealth ($000) 66.27 654.16 5.34 12.89 33.04 
Delta ($000) 116.58 291.66 18.37 42.38 103.72 
Vega ($000) 35.91 69.56 6.21 14.92 37.03 
Risk Avoidance (Utility) 2.51 1.74 1.47 2.24 3.26 
Observations 4539     
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 Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics – Firm Level Data 
This table presents various descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Firm financial data 
are from 1992 to 2009. Panel A presents summary statistics for firm-level data. Crash is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm experiences any stock crash event in any 
given fiscal year. Boom is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm experiences any 
stock boom event in the given fiscal year. Number of crashes and number of booms are 
the number of crashes (respectively, booms) for any firm-year combination. Weekly raw 
return measures the cumulative return per calendar week for any firm-week combination. 
Weekly firm-specific return measures the abnormal return per calendar week multiplied 
by 100 for any firm-week combination. DUVOL and DTURNOVER measure, respectively, 
the average down-to-up volatility and the average monthly de-trended share turnover 
from Chen, Hong and Stein (2001) per each firm-year combination. Market to book ratio 
is market value of the firm divided by book value. Log(Market value) measures the log of 
market capitalization of the firm. Volatility is the stock return volatility. ROA is given by 
operating income before depreciation divided by total assets of the firm. Book leverage is 
the ratio of total book debt to book assets. Market leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
market value of the firm. Panel B presents the same summary statistics for sample with 
available CEO and CFO compensation data. Panel C presents the summary statistics for 
firms with R&D expense and innovation data. R&D Intensity is measured as the ratio of 
R&D expenses to fixed asset (PPENT). Innovation related variables (Adjusted Number of 
patents, Adjusted Number of Citations) are constructed following Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009), which represents number of patents/citation per firm-year 
combination. 
  
Panel A: Firm Level Variables in CEO sample 
 Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
Crash 0.122 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Boom 0.147 0.354 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Crashes 0.141 0.890 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Booms 0.150 0.364 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weekly Raw Return 0.022 0.130 -0.040 0.015 0.074 
Weekly Firm-Specific Return -0.075 0.964 -0.505 -0.046 0.364 
NCSKEW 0.201 0.951 -0.390 0.141 0.700 
DUVOL -0.098 0.391 -0.337 -0.093 0.147 
DTURNOVER 0.105 1.013 -0.124 0.048 0.295 
Market to Book ratio 1.972 2.184 1.106 1.442 2.132 
Log (Market Value) 7.393 1.609 6.294 7.291 8.411 
Volatility 0.451 0.255 0.277 0.384 0.553 
ROA 0.126 0.124 0.075 0.126 0.182 
Book Leverage 0.229 0.194 0.071 0.213 0.342 
Market Leverage 0.168 0.157 0.037 0.131 0.259 
Observations 23859     
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 Panel B: Firm Level Variables in CEO + CFO sample 
 Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
Crash 0.121 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Boom 0.148 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Crashes 0.144 0.971 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Booms 0.150 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weekly Raw Return 0.022 0.132 -0.040 0.015 0.074 
Weekly Firm-Specific Return -0.083 1.001 -0.525 -0.050 0.370 
NCSKEW 0.212 0.959 -0.382 0.155 0.724 
DUVOL -0.099 0.393 -0.339 -0.093 0.147 
DTURNOVER 0.116 1.078 -0.136 0.059 0.336 
Market to Book ratio 1.936 2.033 1.105 1.439 2.097 
Log (Market Value) 7.326 1.577 6.273 7.229 8.310 
Volatility 0.465 0.261 0.286 0.397 0.573 
ROA 0.125 0.119 0.075 0.125 0.180 
Book Leverage 0.230 0.196 0.068 0.215 0.343 
Market Leverage 0.170 0.158 0.037 0.133 0.262 
Observations 18482     
 
 
 
Panel C: Firm Level Variables in Innovation Sample 
 Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
Crash 0.119 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Boom 0.132 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Crashes 0.119 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Booms 0.135 0.350 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weekly Raw Return 0.019 0.149 -0.054 0.012 0.080 
Weekly Firm-Specific Return -0.040 0.943 -0.499 -0.028 0.400 
NCSKEW 0.163 0.922 -0.410 0.110 0.627 
DUVOL -0.115 0.387 -0.355 -0.113 0.132 
DTURNOVER 0.069 1.116 -0.140 0.029 0.232 
Market to Book ratio 2.710 3.896 1.347 1.820 2.841 
Log (Market Value) 7.650 1.696 6.401 7.558 8.717 
Volatility 0.473 0.252 0.288 0.407 0.591 
ROA 0.139 0.140 0.099 0.150 0.202 
Book Leverage 0.198 0.167 0.053 0.189 0.299 
Market Leverage 0.123 0.121 0.018 0.095 0.190 
R&D Intensity 0.706 11.453 0.066 0.198 0.563 
Adjusted Number of Patents 6.816 22.101 0.300 1.000 4.200 
Adjusted Number of Citations 10.114 43.074 0.099 0.757 4.328 
Number of Patents 6.865 22.252 0.300 1.000 4.200 
Number of Citations 3.907 18.373 0.010 0.180 1.410 
Observations 4539     
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 Table 3  
Executive Optimism and Price Crashes 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions with CEO optimism ratio and CFO 
optimism ratio as the main explanatory variables. The dependent variable in the 
regressions is Crash. Standard errors are clustered in both firm and time dimensions 
following Thompson (2011). The number of observations is given in the last row. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Optimism Ratio 0.287*** 0.254*** 0.287*** 0.283*** 0.251*** 
 (3.24) (2.74) (3.13) (3.22) (2.64) 
CFO Optimism Ratio 0.00447 -0.00434 0.00343 -0.00734 -0.0169 
 (0.03) (-0.03) (0.02) (-0.05) (-0.13) 
Weekly Raw Return 0.0820  0.0745 0.156  
 (0.25)  (0.23) (0.47)  
Weekly Firm-Specific 
Return 
 -0.393***   -0.379*** 
  (-5.41)   (-5.39) 
Book Leverage 0.156 0.181  0.141  
 (0.86) (0.94)  (0.79)  
Market Leverage   -0.142  -0.102 
   (-0.50)  (-0.34) 
DUVOL (Weekly) 0.345*** 0.299** 0.333**   
 (2.59) (2.48) (2.52)   
DUVOL (Daily)    0.588*** 0.520*** 
    (4.44) (4.08) 
NCSKEW -0.0902* -0.0741 -0.0849 -0.137*** -0.117*** 
 (-1.67) (-1.56) (-1.54) (-3.40) (-3.15) 
DTURNOVER -0.0165 -0.0207* -0.0160 -0.0166 -0.0195 
 (-1.18) (-1.65) (-1.17) (-1.18) (-1.64) 
Market to Book ratio -0.00594 -0.0222 -0.0103 -0.0000762 -0.0189 
 (-0.16) (-0.63) (-0.30) (-0.00) (-0.59) 
Log (Market Value) 0.00394 -0.0172 0.00569 0.00526 -0.0132 
 (0.10) (-0.52) (0.15) (0.14) (-0.40) 
Volatility -0.100 -0.367 -0.107 -0.0714 -0.336 
 (-0.33) (-1.36) (-0.36) (-0.22) (-1.17) 
ROA 1.086** 1.211** 1.063** 1.105** 1.183** 
 (2.35) (2.42) (2.32) (2.41) (2.43) 
Constant -2.228*** -2.006*** -2.169*** -2.193*** -1.929*** 
 (-7.70) (-8.21) (-7.24) (-7.94) (-7.74) 
Observations 16455 16462 16520 16589 16660 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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 Table 4  
Executive Optimism and Price Booms 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions with CEO optimism ratio and CFO 
optimism ratio as the main explanatory variables. The dependent variable in the 
regressions is Boom. Standard errors are clustered in both firm and time dimensions 
following Thompson (2011). The number of observations is given in the last row. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Optimism Ratio 0.0351 0.0479 0.0325 0.0352 0.0414 
 (0.42) (0.56) (0.40) (0.41) (0.47) 
CFO Optimism Ratio 0.0484 0.0605 0.0427 0.0525 0.0608 
 (0.59) (0.68) (0.50) (0.63) (0.65) 
Weekly Raw Return -0.795***  -0.780*** -0.838***  
 (-4.04)  (-3.95) (-4.15)  
Weekly Firm-Specific 
Return 
 0.242***   0.245*** 
  (5.43)   (5.29) 
Book Leverage 0.141 0.0774  0.148  
 (1.05) (0.55)  (1.14)  
Market Leverage   0.0975  -0.0193 
   (0.53)  (-0.10) 
DUVOL (Weekly) -0.259** -0.210 -0.257**   
 (-2.35) (-1.60) (-2.29)   
DUVOL (Daily)    -0.195*** -0.142** 
    (-2.91) (-2.16) 
NCSKEW 0.109** 0.101 0.109** 0.0750* 0.0702 
 (2.05) (1.53) (2.05) (1.79) (1.52) 
DTURNOVER -0.0330** -0.0304** -0.0321** -0.0344*** -0.0344** 
 (-2.51) (-2.15) (-2.39) (-2.65) (-2.48) 
Market to Book ratio -0.0150 -0.0108 -0.0133 -0.0205 -0.0171 
 (-0.67) (-0.44) (-0.59) (-0.92) (-0.71) 
Log (Market Value) -0.150*** -0.134*** -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.136*** 
 (-5.46) (-4.14) (-5.44) (-5.60) (-4.08) 
Volatility 0.117 0.0934 0.109 0.142 0.119 
 (0.49) (0.31) (0.45) (0.62) (0.42) 
ROA -0.179 -0.208 -0.173 -0.167 -0.188 
 (-0.75) (-0.84) (-0.73) (-0.71) (-0.77) 
Constant -0.802*** -0.910*** -0.788*** -0.775*** -0.873*** 
 (-3.27) (-3.12) (-3.21) (-3.11) (-2.86) 
Observations 16455 16462 16520 16589 16660 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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 Table 7 
Executive Optimism and R&D Intensity, Innovation Effectiveness 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of R&D intensity, innovation intensity 
on CEO optimism variables. The dependent variables in the regression are R&D intensity 
and number of patents/citations adjusted as in Acharya, Subramanian (2009). Standard 
errors are clustered in both firm and time dimensions following Thompson (2011). The 
number of observations is given in the last row. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R&D 
Intensity 
R&D 
Intensity 
Log 
(Adjusted 
Citations) 
Adjusted 
Number of 
Patents 
CEO Optimism Ratio 0.0848  -0.164* -1.336 
 (1.05)  (-1.75) (-1.09) 
CFO Optimism Ratio -0.138*  -0.138 -0.799 
 (-1.79)  (-1.46) (-0.55) 
CEO Stock Alignment -0.719*** -0.452*** 0.352 -1.643 
 (-4.22) (-2.83) (1.51) (-0.58) 
CEO Option Alignment 0.974*** 0.912*** -0.618** -4.978 
 (3.36) (3.62) (-2.23) (-1.10) 
CFO Stock Alignment  -0.980** -0.379 -7.421 
  (-2.36) (-0.75) (-1.58) 
CFO Option Alignment  1.710*** -0.301 -3.695 
  (4.10) (-0.64) (-0.53) 
R&D Intensity   0.0150 0.140 
   (1.10) (0.93) 
Weekly Raw Return -0.110 0.203 -0.228 -5.028*** 
 (-0.32) (0.65) (-0.95) (-4.12) 
Book Leverage -1.029* -1.057** -0.349* -3.097 
 (-1.86) (-2.09) (-1.92) (-1.51) 
Market to Book ratio 0.132*  -0.0167 -0.527** 
 (1.83)  (-1.29) (-2.09) 
Log (Market Value) -0.0840** -0.0795** 0.336*** 5.457*** 
 (-2.34) (-2.31) (5.14) (3.92) 
Volatility 0.200 0.431*** 0.579* 10.38** 
 (1.02) (2.58) (1.75) (2.53) 
ROA -5.564*** -5.088*** 0.999** 1.898 
 (-3.75) (-3.66) (2.24) (0.43) 
Constant 1.769*** 1.691*** -1.660*** -36.13*** 
 (3.77) (3.86) (-5.11) (-4.04) 
Observations 9320 9667 2974 2974 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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 Table 8 
R&D Intensity, Innovation Effectiveness, and Price Crashes 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions with R&D intensity, innovation 
effectiveness, CEO optimism ratio and CFO optimism ratio as the main explanatory 
variables. Standard errors are clustered in both firm and time dimensions following 
Thompson (2011). The number of observations is given in the last row. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Optimism Ratio  0.620*** 0.683*** 0.642*** 0.698*** 
 (2.72) (3.25) (2.84) (3.34) 
CFO Optimism Ratio  -0.500 -0.603* -0.469 -0.572 
 (-1.58) (-1.67) (-1.51) (-1.62) 
CEO Stock Alignment  0.0781  -0.00480 
  (0.18)  (-0.01) 
CEO Option Alignment  -0.717  -0.636 
  (-1.46)  (-1.32) 
CFO Option Alignment  1.679  1.711* 
  (1.59)  (1.68) 
CFO Stock Alignment  -0.988  -0.979 
  (-0.73)  (-0.71) 
R&D Intensity 0.0965** 0.0931** 0.0935** 0.0897* 
 (2.19) (2.02) (2.11) (1.92) 
Adjusted Number of    -0.00705 -0.00721 
Patents   (-0.89) (-0.92) 
Adjusted Number of  -0.232*** -0.233***   
Citations (-3.21) (-3.22)   
Weekly Raw Return 0.738 0.722 0.753 0.738 
 (1.42) (1.42) (1.40) (1.39) 
Book Leverage 1.010 1.012 1.088 1.081 
 (1.54) (1.54) (1.63) (1.63) 
NCSKEW 0.0137 0.00631 0.0299 0.0215 
 (0.24) (0.11) (0.54) (0.38) 
DTURNOVER -0.0669 -0.0667 -0.0698 -0.0690 
 (-1.57) (-1.54) (-1.59) (-1.54) 
Market to Book ratio -0.208*** -0.227*** -0.196*** -0.216*** 
 (-5.80) (-4.30) (-6.09) (-4.39) 
Log (Market Value) 0.0869* 0.0715 0.0477 0.0297 
 (1.70) (1.36) (0.80) (0.48) 
Volatility 0.652 0.602 0.550 0.495 
 (1.39) (1.21) (1.11) (0.94) 
ROA 4.836*** 4.863*** 4.472*** 4.515*** 
 (5.88) (5.55) (6.04) (5.65) 
Constant -3.358*** -3.206*** -3.196*** -3.024*** 
 (-5.85) (-5.38) (-4.80) (-4.31) 
Observations 2921 2921 2921 2921 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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 Table 9 
CEO Optimism and Price Crashes 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions of the occurrence of price crashes on 
CEO optimism variables. The results deviate from Table 3 because CFO incentives are no 
longer required in the regressions, so that the sample becomes larger. The dependent 
variable in the regression is Crash. Standard errors are clustered in both firm and time 
dimensions following Thompson (2011). The number of observations is given in the last 
row. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Optimism Ratio 0.176** 0.175** 0.171** 0.131* 
 (2.16) (2.14) (2.05) (1.66) 
Vega ($000)  1.05E-4 1.06E-4 6.69E-5 
  (1.29) (1.25) (0.85) 
Delta ($000)  -2.84E-6 -2.06E-6 -6.00E-6 
  (-0.37) (-0.28) (-0.72) 
CEO Risk Avoidance    -0.0111  
   (-0.88)  
CEO Stock Alignment    0.0302 
    (0.27) 
CEO Option Alignment    0.438* 
    (1.66) 
Weekly Raw Return 0.165 0.167 0.173 0.162 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.47) 
NCSKEW 0.0521* 0.0509* 0.0486* 0.0505* 
 (1.95) (1.92) (1.86) (1.92) 
DTURNOVER -0.0162 -0.0158 -0.0160 -0.0154 
 (-1.07) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.03) 
Market to Book ratio -0.00650 -0.00592 -0.00436 -0.0160 
 (-0.20) (-0.18) (-0.13) (-0.49) 
Log (Market Value) 0.0132 0.00684 0.00726 -0.00530 
 (0.39) (0.19) (0.20) (-0.14) 
Volatility -0.195 -0.199 -0.176 -0.232 
 (-0.71) (-0.73) (-0.64) (-0.85) 
ROA 1.180*** 1.188*** 1.200*** 1.218*** 
 (3.32) (3.32) (3.41) (3.35) 
Book Leverage 0.226 0.226 0.225 0.243 
 (1.31) (1.30) (1.30) (1.44) 
Constant -2.291*** -2.252*** -2.241*** -2.170*** 
 (-9.65) (-8.87) (-8.84) (-8.57) 
Observations 21881 21881 21879 21877 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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 Table 12  
Executive Optimism Removing Out-of-the-Money Options 
Panel A presents the summary statistics of optimism ratios reconstructed by removing 
out-of-the-money options. Panel B presents the results of logistic regressions with the 
new optimism ratios as the main explanatory variables. The dependent variable in the 
regressions is Crash. Standard errors are clustered in both firm and time dimensions 
following Thompson (2011). The number of observations is given in the last row. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Std P25 P50 P75 
CEO Optimism Ratio  0.47 0.30 0.23 0.50 0.72 
CFO Optimism Ratio 0.40 0.29 0.15 0.40 0.63 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO Optimism Ratio 0.254*** 0.227*** 0.254*** 0.249*** 0.223*** 
 (3.06) (2.68) (2.98) (3.09) (2.59) 
CFO Optimism Ratio 0.0148 -0.000157 0.0128 0.00248 -0.0130 
 (0.11) (-0.00) (0.09) (0.02) (-0.10) 
Weekly Raw Return 0.0736  0.0661 0.148  
 (0.23)  (0.20) (0.45)  
Book Leverage 0.157 0.140  0.142  
 (0.87) (0.72)  (0.79)  
Market Leverage   -0.141  -0.180 
   (-0.50)  (-0.60) 
DUVOL (Weekly) 0.344** 0.330** 0.332**   
 (2.57) (2.56) (2.50)   
DUVOL (Daily)    0.589*** 0.529*** 
    (4.45) (4.17) 
NCSKEW -0.0889 -0.0889* -0.0835 -0.136*** -0.123*** 
 (-1.63) (-1.81) (-1.51) (-3.38) (-3.53) 
DTURNOVER -0.0167 -0.0233* -0.0162 -0.0167 -0.0220* 
 (-1.19) (-1.74) (-1.17) (-1.18) (-1.75) 
Market to Book ratio -0.00513 -0.0216 -0.00947 0.000675 -0.0199 
 (-0.14) (-0.60) (-0.27) (0.02) (-0.60) 
Log (Market Value) 0.00382 -0.0132 0.00557 0.00522 -0.00917 
 (0.10) (-0.39) (0.15) (0.14) (-0.27) 
Volatility -0.112 -0.647*** -0.119 -0.0819 -0.615*** 
 (-0.37) (-3.06) (-0.39) (-0.25) (-2.74) 
ROA 1.085** 1.224** 1.062** 1.103** 1.188** 
 (2.36) (2.44) (2.33) (2.42) (2.45) 
Constant -2.210*** -1.944*** -2.150*** -2.175*** -1.862*** 
 (-7.47) (-7.92) (-7.03) (-7.71) (-7.35) 
Observations 16455 16462 16520 16589 16660 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1.A 
Distribution of CEO optimism ratio  
(exercisable option delta / total option delta) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.B 
Distribution of CEO optimism ratio (Stock) 
(unrestricted stock delta / total stock delta) 
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Figure 1.C 
Distribution of CFO optimism ratio  
(exercisable option delta / total option delta) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.D 
Distribution of CFO optimism ratio (Stock) 
(unrestricted stock delta / total stock delta) 
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Figure 2.A 
Distribution of CEO optimism ratio before 2002 
(exercisable option delta / total option delta) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.B 
Distribution of CEO optimism ratio after 2002 
(exercisable option delta / total option delta) 
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Chapter 3
How Important are Risk-Taking Incentives
in Executive Compensation?1
We consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking incentives
in addition to e¤ort incentives. We show that the optimal contract protects the CEO from losses
for bad outcomes, is convex for medium outcomes, and concave for good outcomes. We calibrate
the model to data on 727 CEOs and show that it can explain observed contracts much better
than the standard model without risk-taking incentives. Moreover, we propose a new measure
of risk-taking (dis)incentives that measures the required probability an additional risky project
must exceed in order to be adopted by the CEO.
1This chapter is based on Dittmann and Yu (2011).
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3.1 Introduction
This paper addresses the question to what extent the inclusion of risk-taking incentives in the
standard model of executive compensation helps to rationalize observed compensation practice
qualitatively and quantitatively. Our point of departure is the Holmström (1979) model, where
shareholders wish to provide incentives to a risk-averse and e¤ort-averse CEO to induce him to
work hard. This model fails to rationalize observed compensation practice as Hall and Murphy
(2002) and Dittmann and Maug (2007) demonstrate, because it cannot explain convex contracts.
In this paper, we augment the standard model by assuming that shareholders take into account
not only e¤ort incentives but also risk-taking incentives when designing the compensation con-
tract. We show that the augmented model predicts a contract that is at for poor performance,
convex for medium performance, and concave for high performance. We calibrate the optimal
contract shape to the data and nd that the augmented model approximates observed contracts
much better than the model without risk-taking incentives.
The notion that shareholders might want to provide risk-taking incentives in addition
to e¤ort incentives goes back at least to Smith and Stulz (1985) and Haugen and Senbet (1981).
CEOs not only exert e¤ort and thereby shift the stock price distribution to the right, but they
also make decisions that a¤ect rm value and rm risk (i.e. location and dispersion of the stock
price distribution). Accordingly, there is ample empirical evidence that risk-taking incentives
matter for CEOsactual risk-taking. Low (2009), for instance, investigates an exogenous in-
crease in takeover protection. In a di¤erences-in-di¤erences analysis, she nds that those rms
with little CEO risk-taking incentives experienced a sharp decline in rm risk and rm value.2
2Tufano (1996) and Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) show that CEOs respond to risk-taking incentives for
hedging decisions, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) for investment decisions, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and
Tchistyi, Yermack and Yun (2010) for capital structure decisions, and May (1995), Smith and Swan (2007), and
Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2008) for corporate acquisitions. DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990) and Billett,
Mauer and Zhang (2010) investigate the reaction of stock and bond prices to rst time equity grants and nd
that investors expect that these grants a¤ect rm risk.
46
Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) and Feltham and Wu (2001) show that optimal contracts are convex
if they are designed to also provide risk-taking incentives. Therefore, the obvious way to x
the standard model and to introduce convexity into the optimal contract is the inclusion of
risk-taking considerations.3
The CEO in our model not only exerts costly e¤ort but also determines the rms
strategy, i.e. he makes decisions on issues like project choice, mergers and acquisitions, capital
structure, or nancial transactions. The CEO is risk-averse and holds rm equity that provides
him with e¤ort incentives. If the contract does not provide su¢ cient risk-taking incentives,
the CEO therefore chooses a strategy that avoids risk and depresses rm value. He might, for
instance, pass up a protable but very risky project, or might hedge his rms risk at some cost.
Shareholders can mitigate this ine¢ ciency by providing risk-taking incentives such as rewarding
the manager for extreme outcomes, but they must be careful not to impair e¤ort incentives
at the same time. While high stock price realizations are an unmistakably good signal, low
stock price realizations are ambiguous: they can be indicative of low e¤ort (which is bad) or of
extensive risk-taking (which is good, given that the CEO leans towards ine¢ ciently low risk).
The best way to provide e¤ort and risk-taking incentives therefore is to reward good outcomes
and not to punish bad outcomes, i.e. the optimal contract features a limited downside.
The optimal contract in our model di¤ers markedly from the one in the standard
model without risk-taking incentives. As marginal utility rapidly declines with CEO wealth, the
standard model predicts that the CEO is punished severely for bad outcomes while he e¤ectively
receives a xed wage for medium and good outcomes. In our model, however, rms pay a at
3There are several alternative explanations for the convexity in CEO contracts. Oyer (2004) models options
as a device to retain employees when recontracting is expensive. Inderst and Müller (2005) explain options as
instruments that provide outside shareholders with better liquidation incentives. Edmans and Gabaix (2009) and
Edmans et al. (2009) show that convex contracts can arise in dynamic contracting models. Peng and Röell (2009)
analyze stock price manipulations in a model with multiplicative CEO preferences and nd convex contracts for
some parameterizations. Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) show that optimal contracts are convex if the CEO
is loss-averse. Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia (1999) assume gamma distributed stock prices and nd convex
contracts, but Dittmann and Maug (2007) show that these results are not robust.
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wage for bad outcomes and provide incentives only for medium and high outcomes. Due to
decreasing marginal utility, the payout function is convex for medium and concave for high
outcomes.
We calibrate both models to the data on 727 U.S. CEOs and for each generate pre-
dictions about the optimal payout function. We then compare the optimal with the observed
payout function and nd that our model can explain observed contracts much better than the
standard model without risk-taking incentives. In particular, the average distance between ob-
served contract and optimal contract is 8:0% for our model compared to 28:8% for the model
without risk-taking incentives.
Our calibration approach bridges the gap between theoretical and empirical research on
executive compensation and allows us to test the quantitative (and not just the qualitative) im-
plications of di¤erent models. Moreover, this approach contributes to the empirical literature on
CEO compensation as it circumvents the endogeneity problem that shareholders simultaneously
determine rm risk and managerial incentives when they design the compensation contract. We
model this endogeneity and test the predictions of the model. Under the assumptions that con-
tracting is e¢ cient and that CEOs are e¤ort-averse and risk-averse, our results imply that the
provision of risk-taking incentives is a major objective in executive compensation practice. We
can reject the hypothesis that risk-taking incentives in observed contracts are a mere by-product
of e¤ort incentives.
Another contribution to the empirical literature is a new measure of risk-taking (dis-
)incentives that combines the managers risk preferences with the shape of his compensation
contract and that we call risk-avoidance. It measures the required protability an additional
risky project must exceed in order to be adopted by the CEO. The median risk avoidance in our
sample is 1.25 for a risk-aversion parameter of 2. Hence, the median CEO will adopt a project
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that increases rm risk by one percentage point if and only if it increases rm value by at least
1.25%. The standard measure for risk-taking incentives in the empirical literature is the vega
of the CEOs option portfolio (see, e.g., Guay, 1999) or the utility-adjusted vega (see Lambert,
Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991)). We argue that risk-taking incentives not only depend on the
(utility-adjusted) vega but also on the (utility-adjusted) delta. While a negative utility-adjusted
vega suggests that the CEO will pass up risky, positive-NPV projects, this e¤ect is mitigated if
the CEO has high (utility-adjusted) delta as this means that he gains from taking positive-NPV
actions. Consequently, our proposed measure of risk-taking incentives is related to the ratio of
utility-adjusted vega over utility-adjusted delta.
There are a few theory papers that also consider both e¤ort-aversion and risk-taking
incentives in models of executive compensation.4 To our knowledge, this paper is the rst,
however, to calibrate such a model and to test its quantitative implications. In this way, we also
contribute to recent literature on calibrations of contracting models.5
We attribute the convexity in observed contracts to the provision of risk-taking incen-
tives in this paper, and we acknowledge that there are alternative explanations for the use of
options in executive compensation (see Footnote 3 above). The only alternative model that
can be readily calibrated to the data is Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2011) where the CEO is
assumed to be loss averse. We also calibrate this model to our data and nd that its t is
comparable to the t of our model. In addition, we show that the loss-aversion model does
4Lambert (1986) and Core and Qian (2002) consider discrete volatility choices, where the agent must exert
e¤ort to gather information about investment projects. Feltham and Wu (2001) and Lambert and Larcker (2004)
assume that the agents choice of e¤ort simultaneously a¤ects mean and variance of the rm value distribution,
so they reduce the two-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional problem. Two other papers (and our model)
work with continuous e¤ort and volatility choice: Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) analyze a rather stylized principal-
agent model and solve it for special cases. Flor, Frimor and Munk (2011) consider a similar model to ours
but they work with the assumption that stock prices are normally distributed while we work with the lognormal
distribution. Hellwig (2009) and Sung (1995) solve models with continuous e¤ort and volatility choice, but Hellwig
(2009) assumes that the agent is risk-neutral and Sung (1995) that the principal can observe (and e¤ectively set)
volatility. In a di¤erent type of model, Manso (2010) also establishes that optimal contracts must not punish bad
outcomes when risk-taking (innovation) needs to be encouraged.
5See Dittmann and Maug (2007), Gabaix and Landier (2008), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2008), Dittmann,
Maug, and Spalt (2010), and Dittmann, Maug and, Zhang (2011)
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not improve much when shareholders take risk-taking incentives into account. The reason is
that the standard loss-aversion model already predicts convex contracts with similar risk-taking
incentives as the observed contract.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present our model and derive
the shape of the optimal contract. Section 3 describes the construction of the dataset, and
Section 4 derives and empirically analyzes our proposed measure of CEO risk-taking incentives.
In Section 5, we present our calibration method and our main results. In a nutshell, we numer-
ically search for the cheapest contract with a given shape that provides the manager with the
same incentives and the same utility as the observed contract. Section 6 provides robustness
checks. Section 7 contains our analysis for the loss-aversion model, and Section 8 concludes.
The appendix collects some technical material.
3.2 Optimal contracting with risk-taking incentives
3.2.1 Model
We consider two points in time. At time t = 0 the contract between a risk-neutral principal (the
shareholders) and a risk-averse agent (CEO) is signed, and at time t = T the contract period
ends. The market value of the rm at time t = 0 (after the contract details have been disclosed)
is P0 = E(PT ) expf rfTg, where rf is the appropriate rate of return. At some point during
the contract period (0; T ), the agent makes two choices. First, he chooses e¤ort e 2 [0;1)
that results in private costs C(e) to the agent and that a¤ects the rms expected value E(PT ).
Second, he chooses a strategy s that a¤ects the rms expected value E(PT ) and the rms stock
return volatility . We will refer to  interchangeably as rm risk. We can therefore write
E(PT ) = P0(e; s) expfrfTg and  = (s).6
6In our model, e¤ort only a¤ects expected value but not rm risk whereas strategy a¤ects both value and risk.
Other models (e.g. Feltham and Wu, 2001) assume that the agent only chooses e¤ort and that e¤ort a¤ects value
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Our model is in the spirit of Holmström (1979). The agent can costlessly destroy output
or inate volatility , and the principal cannot observe the agents actions. As a consequence,
the managers wealth WT = w(PT ) only depends on the end-of-period stock price PT , and the
wage scheme w(:) is non-decreasing.
We think of the strategy s as a feasible combination of many di¤erent actions that a¤ect,
among other things, project choice, mergers and acquisitions, capital structure, or nancial
transactions. Part of the strategy could be, for instance, an R&D project that increases value
and risk. Another part could be nancial hedging of some input factor which would reduce value
and risk. Due to its richness, we do not model the agents choice of strategy in detail. Instead
we assume that the contract chosen by the rm does not make the CEO risk-seeking, and we
show in our empirical analysis below that this assumption always holds.7 Therefore, the CEO
chooses an action that minimizes rm risk  given expected value E(PT ), or equivalently that
maximizes expected value E(PT ) given risk . Let es(e; ) denote the strategy that maximizes
expected value E(PT ) given e¤ort e and volatility . Then the agents choice of e¤ort e and
strategy s is equivalent to a choice of e¤ort e and volatility : E(PT ) = P0(e; es(e; )) expfrfTg =
P0(e; ) expfrfTg: In the remainder of this paper, we therefore work with the reduced form of
our model where the agent chooses e¤ort e and volatility .
We assume that there is a rst-best rm strategy s(e) that maximizes rm value
(given e¤ort e). Let (e) := (s(e)) denote the (minimum) rm risk that is associated with
this strategy. If the agent wants to reduce risk to some value below (e), he can do so in two
and risk. The main di¤erence between Feltham and Wu (2001) and our model in this respect is that our model
allows the CEO to a¤ect value and risk independently of each other.
7More formally, we assume that the CEOs expected utility declines when volatility  increases. This assump-
tion is intuitive: A risk-averse CEO whose wealth is linked to rm-value is averse to an increase in rm risk
. Providing risk-taking incentives by making the contract more convex (while keeping e¤ort incentives and the
CEOs utility constant) is costly. Therefore, rms will never increase risk-taking incentives beyond the optimal
point where the CEO is indi¤erent to rm risk.
While this assumption is intuitive, we cannot show it formally. The reason is that the costs of an increase in
risk-taking incentives given that e¤ort incentives and utility are held constant cannot be written in closed-form.
However, our empirical results below are consistent with this assumption. In particular, we nd that risk-taking
incentives are always costly.
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ways. Either he drops some risky but protable projects (e.g., an R&D project), or he takes
an additional action that reduces risk but also prots (e.g., costly hedging). In both cases, a
reduction in volatility  leads to a reduction in rm value E(PT ). We therefore assume that
P0(e; ) is increasing and concave in  as long as  < (e). In the region above (e), rm
value P0(e; ) is weakly decreasing in ; it is at if the agent can take additional risk at no costs
(e.g., with nancial transactions). Finally, we assume that the stock price P0(e; ) is increasing
and concave in e (given volatility ).
We assume that the end-of-period stock price PT is lognormally distributed:
PT (uje; ) = P0 (e; ) exp

rf   
2
2

T + u
p
T

; u  N (0; 1) : (3.2.1)
Here, rf is the risk-free rate, and P0(e; ) = E(PT (uje; )) expf rfTg is the expected present
value of the end-of-period stock price PT .8
The managers utility is additively separable in wealth and e¤ort and has constant
relative risk aversion with parameter  with respect to wealth WT :
U (WT ; e) = V (WT )  C (e) = W
1 
T
1     C (e) : (3.2.2)
If  = 1, we dene V (WT ) = ln(WT ). Costs of e¤ort are assumed to be increasing and convex in
e¤ort, i.e. C 0(e) > 0 and C 00(e) > 0. We normalize C(0) = 0. There is no direct cost associated
with the managers choice of volatility. Volatility  a¤ects the managers utility indirectly via
the stock price distribution and the utility function V (:). Finally, we assume that the manager
has outside employment opportunities that give him expected utility U .
8We follow Dittmann and Maug (2007) and assume that either there is no premium for systematic risk or that
the rm has no exposure to systematic risk, so that the risk-free rate rf is the appropriate stock return. This
assumption allows us to abstract from the agents portfolio problem, because in our model the only alternative to
an investment in the own rm is an investment at the risk-free rate. If we allowed the agent to earn a risk-premium
on the shares of his rm, he could value these above their actual market price, because investing into his own
rm is then the only way to earn the risk-premium. Our assumption e¤ectively means that all risk in the model
is rm-specic.
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3.2.2 Optimal contract
In order to implement a given e¤ort e and level of volatility , shareholders solve the following
optimization problem:
min
WT
E [WT (PT )je; ] (3.2.3)
subject to
dWT (PT )
dPT
 0 for all PT (3.2.4)
E [V (WT (PT ))je; ]  C(e)  U (3.2.5)
fe; g 2 argmax fE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]  C(e)g (3.2.6)
Hence, shareholders choose the wage schedule WT (PT ) that minimizes contracting costs subject
to three constraints: The monotonicity constraint (3.2.4), the participation constraint (4.2.4),
and the incentive compatibility constraint (4.2.5). We replace (4.2.5) with its rst-order condi-
tions
dE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]
de
  dC
de
= 0; (3.2.7)
dE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]
d
= 0: (3.2.8)
We discuss the validity of the rst-order approach (i.e. that (4.2.5) can indeed be replaced
by (4.2.6) and (4.2.7)) in detail in Appendix A. We call condition (4.2.6) the e¤ort incentive
constraint and (4.2.7) the volatility incentive constraint.
Proposition 1 (Optimal contract): The optimal contract that solves the shareholdersprob-
lem (4.2.3), (3.2.4), (4.2.4), (4.2.6), and (4.2.7) has the following functional form:
dV (W T )
dWT
=
8>><>>:
c0 + c1 lnPT + c2(lnPT )
2 if ln(PT ) >   c12c2
c0   c
2
1
4c2
if ln(PT )    c12c2
(3.2.9)
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where c0, c1, and c2 depend on the distribution of PT and the Lagrange multipliers of the opti-
mization problem, with c2 > 0. For constant relative risk aversion, we obtain
W T =
8>><>>:

c0 + c1 lnPT + c2(lnPT )
2
1= if ln(PT ) >   c12c2h
c0   c
2
1
4c2
i1=
if ln(PT )    c12c2
(3.2.10)
The proof of Proposition 1 and full expressions for the parameters c0, c1, and c2 can be
found in Appendix B. To develop an intuition for the optimal contract (3.2.10) it is instructive
to look rst at the optimal contract without risk-taking incentives. This contract has the form
W T = c0 + c1 lnPT and is globally concave as long as   1 (see Dittmann and Maug, 2007).
The comparison shows that risk-taking incentives are provided by the additional quadratic term
c2(lnPT )
2. This term makes the contract more convex and limits its downside, two features that
make risk-taking more attractive for a risk-averse agent. To satisfy the monotonicity constraint,
the downward sloping part of the wage function due to the quadratic term is replaced by a at
wage. The resulting contract (3.2.10) is at below some threshold eP = expf  c12c2 g, convex and
increasing for some region above this threshold, and nally concave, because the concavity of
the logarithm dominates the convexity of the quadratic term asymptotically.
3.3 Data set
We use the ExecuComp database to construct approximate CEO contracts at the beginning of
the 2006 scal year.9 We rst identify all persons in the database who were CEO during the full
year 2006 and executive of the same company in 2005. We calculate the base salary  (which
is the sum of salary, bonus, and "other compensation" from ExecuComp) from 2006 data, and
take information on stock and option holdings from the end of the 2005 scal year. We subsume
9We do not perform our analysis for a more recent year for two reasons. First, we cannot construct our sample
consistently for 2007, because there was a signicant change in the reporting standard in 2006; some rms reported
according to the new standard while other rms still used the old standard. Second, we did not choose 2008 or
2009 to avoid using data from the nancial crisis.
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bonus payments under base salary, because previous research has shown that bonus payments
are only weakly related to rm performance (see Hall and Liebman, 1998).10
We estimate each CEOs option portfolio with the method proposed by Core and Guay
(2002) and then aggregate this portfolio into one representative option. This aggregation is
necessary to arrive at a parsimonious wage function that can be calibrated to the data. Our
model is static and therefore cannot accommodate option grants with di¤erent maturities. The
representative option is determined so that it has a similar e¤ect as the actual option portfolio
on the agents utility, his e¤ort incentives, and his risk-taking incentives. More precisely, we
numerically calculate the number of options nO, the strike price K, and the maturity T so that
the representative option has the same Black-Scholes value, the same option delta, and the same
option vega as the estimated option portfolio.11 In this step, we lose ve CEOs for whom we
cannot numerically solve this system of three equations in three unknowns.
We take the rms market capitalization P0 from the end of the 2005 scal year. While
our formulae above abstract from dividend payments for the sake of simplicity, we take dividends
into account in our empirical work and use the dividend rate d from 2005. We estimate the rms
stock return volatility  from daily CRSP stock returns over the scal year 2006 and drop all
rms with fewer than 220 daily stock returns on CRSP. We use the CRSP/Compustat Merged
Database to link ExecuComp with CRSP data. The risk-free rate is set to the U.S. government
bond yield with ve-year maturity from January 2006.
We estimate the non-rm wealth W0 of each CEO from the ExecuComp database by
10We do not take into account pension benets, because they are di¢ cult to compile and because there is no role
for pensions in a one-period model. Pensions can be regarded as negative risk-taking incentives (see Sundaram and
Yermack, 2007, and Edmans and Liu, 2010), so that we overestimate risk-taking incentives in observed contracts.
11Appendix F contains more details about this algorithm. We take into account the fact that most CEOs
exercise their stock options before maturity by multiplying the maturities of the individual option grants by
0.7 before calculating the representative option (see Huddart and Lang, 1996, and Carpenter, 1998). In these
calculations, we use the stock return volatility from ExecuComp and, for the risk-free rate, the U.S. government
bond yield with 5-year maturity from January 2006. Data on risk-free rates have been obtained from the Federal
Reserve Boards website. For CEOs who do not have any options, we set K = P0 and T = 10 (multiplied by 0.7)
as these are typical values for newly granted options.
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assuming that all historic cash inows from salary and the sale of shares minus the costs of
exercising options have been accumulated and invested year after year at the one-year risk-free
rate. We assume that the CEO had zero wealth when he entered the database (which biases
our estimate downward) and that he did not consume since then (which biases our estimate
upward).12 To arrive at meaningful wealth estimates, we discard all CEOs who do not have a
history of at least ve years (from 2001 to 2005) on ExecuComp. During this period, they need
not be CEO. This procedure results in a data set with 727 CEOs.
Table 1 provides an overview of our data set. The median CEO owns 0.32% of the stock
of his company and has options on an additional 0.92% of the companys stock. The median
base salary is $1.04m, and the median non-rm wealth is $12.0m. The representative option
has a median maturity of 4:4 years and is well in the money with a moneyness (K=P0) of 72%.
Most stock options are granted at the money in the United States (see Murphy, 1999), but after
a few years they are likely to be in the money. This is the reason why the representative option
grant is in the money for 90% of the CEOs in our sample. In the interest of readability, we call
an option with a strike price K that is close to the observed strike price Kd an "at-the-money
option." Consequently, we call an option grant "in-the-money" only if its strike price K is lower
than the observed strike price Kd.
We require that all CEOs in our data set are included in the ExecuComp database for
the years 2001 to 2006, and this requirement is likely to bias our data set towards surviving
CEOs, namely those who are older and richer and who work in bigger and more successful rms.
Table 1 Panel B describes the full ExecuComp universe of CEOs in 2006. Compared to this
larger sample, our CEOs are, on average, one year older and work in bigger rms (+$450m)
with better past performance (1:3% higher return during the past ve years). In a robustness
12These wealth estimates can be downloaded for all years and all executives in ExecuComp from
http://people.few.eur.nl/dittmann/data.htm. They have also been used by Dittmann and Maug (2007) and
Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010).
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check below, we analyze in how far this selection bias a¤ects our results.
The only parameter in our model that we cannot estimate from the data is the man-
agers coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion . We use  = 3 in most of our analysis and provide
robustness checks for  = 0:5 and  = 6. This range includes the risk-aversion parameters used
in previous research.13
3.4 Measuring Risk-taking Incentives
In the empirical literature on executive compensation, risk-taking incentives are usually mea-
sured by the vega of the managers equity portfolio, i.e. by the partial derivative of the managers
wealth with respect to his own rms stock return volatility.14 An exception are Lambert, Lar-
cker and Verrecchia (1991) who work with what we call the "utility adjusted vega", i.e. the
partial derivative of the managers expected utility with respect to stock return volatility. How-
ever, there is another e¤ect of volatility on managerial utility that - to the best of our knowledge
- has been ignored in the empirical literature on risk-taking incentives. Depending on whether
or not the CEO has too little or too much incentives to take risk, a rise in volatility respectively
increases or decreases rm value and, due to the CEOs equity portfolio, managerial utility. In
this subsection, we derive this result formally from our model and propose a new measure of
risk-taking incentives that combines the two e¤ects.
In our model, risk-taking incentives are described in the volatility incentive constraint
(4.2.7). This constraint can be rewritten as
E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dPT
dPT
d
 e;  = 0 (3.4.1)
Substituting in the derivative of the stock price PT with respect to volatility  from (4.2.1)
13Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) use values between 0.5 and 4. Carpenter (1998) and Hall and
Murphy (2000) use  = 2. Hall and Murphy (2002) use  = 2 and 3.
14See, among others, Guay (1999), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002), Habib and
Ljungqvist (2005), and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006).
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yields
, E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dPT

dP0
d
PT
P0
+ PT

 T + u
p
T
 e;  = 0: (3.4.2)
As dP0=d is not random, we can rearrange (3.4.2) as
PPSua
dP0
d
=  ua; (3.4.3)
where PPSua := E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dP0
 e;  = E  dV (WT )dWT dWTdPT PTP0
 e;  (3.4.4)
and ua := E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dPT
PT

 T + u
p
T
 e;  : (3.4.5)
Here, PPSua is the utility adjusted pay-for-performance sensitivity, or the utility adjusted delta,
which measures how much the managers expected utility rises for a marginal stock price increase.
Likewise, ua is the utility adjusted vega, i.e. the marginal increase in the managers expected
utility for a marginal increase in volatility - assuming that rm value P0 stays constant.
The rst order condition (3.4.3) equates marginal benets to marginal costs of an
increase in volatility from the agents point of view. The benets stem from an increase in rm
value dP0=d in which the manager participates via his incentive pay PPSua. The costs are
given by the decrease of the managers utility  ua due to higher volatility. Hence, the agent
will take an action if only if its benets exceed its cost, i.e if
PPSua
dP0
d
>  ua , dP0
d
1
P0
>   
ua
PPSua
1
P0
: (3.4.6)
We therefore dene the incentives to avoid risk as
 :=   
ua
PPSua
1
P0
: (3.4.7)
Appendix F contains a step by step users guide on how to numerically calculate risk avoidance
.
Equation (3.4.7) denes a hurdle rate:  is the required increase in rm value per
increase in rm risk that any new project must fulll in order to be adopted by the CEO.
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Consider a project that would increase rm risk by one percentage point, e.g., from 30% to 31%,
and let  = 2. Then the agent takes this project only if it increases rm value by at least 2%.
All positive NPV projects that generate less than 2% increase in rm value for each percent of
additional risk will be passed up. On the other hand if  < 0, the agent has incentives to take
on risky projects with negative NPV. In the above example of a project that increases rm risk
by one percentage point,  =  2 means that the agent is willing to undertake this project as
long as it does not destroy more than 2% of rm value. If  = 0, the CEO is indi¤erent to rm
risk and will therefore implement all protable projects irrespective of their riskyness. We refer
to  as incentives to avoid risk or risk avoidance, and to   as risk-taking incentives.
Our main conceptual result is that the utility adjusted vega alone is not the best
measure of risk taking incentives, but that it should be scaled by the utility adjusted delta.
To understand why this scaling is necessary, rst consider the case where vega is negative, and
so the manager wishes to avoid risky, positive-NPV projects. However, this e¤ect is mitigated
if the CEO has a high delta as this means that he gains from taking positive-NPV actions.
Second, consider the case where vega is positive, and so the manager has an incentive to take
risky projects even if they are negative-NPV. Again, this e¤ect is mitigated if the CEO has a
high delta as it means that he is hurt by taking negative-NPV actions. Regardless of the sign of
vega, the incentives to take too little or too much risk are o¤set by a high delta, so the measure
of risk-taking incentives depends on the ratio of vega to delta.
Table 2, Panel A displays descriptive statistics for the incentives to avoid risk  in the
observed contract for ve values of risk aversion . In all cases, risk avoidance  is positive for
most CEOs; for   3 it is positive for virtually all CEOs. The results in Table 2 are therefore
consistent with our assumption that the contracts chosen by the rm do not make CEOs risk-
seeking. For  = 3, the average  is 1:87 and the median is 1:75. This implies that the average
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CEO in our sample passes up risky positive NPV projects if they increase m value by less
than 1:87% per percentage point of additional volatility. For lower values of risk aversion ,
risk-avoidance is lower. For  = 0:5, the average and median  are 0:19.
While risk-avoidance  is zero in the rst-best optimum, it is positive in the second-best
optimum as risk-taking incentives are costly. It is di¢ cult to judge, however, what a plausible
optimal level for  is, because the optimal level depends on the availability of risky projects:
a rm that has only few risky projects will not benet much from an increase in risk-taking
incentives. Nevertheless, a median  of 1:75 for  = 3 appears large when taking into account
that CEO pay typically makes up only about 1% of rm value (see the median of value of
contract and rm value in Table 1). A potential reason is that CEOs are less risk averse
(see Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2009), so that  < 3. We still use  = 3 as the base case
in this paper because it is a conservative choice; the t of our model to the data improves as
 decreases. Another reason why risk avoidance  is high in Table 2, Panel A is that major
shareholders might not be well diversied and therefore want to take ine¢ ciently low risk (see
Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, 2010).
3.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we calibrate the optimal contract (3.2.10) to the data and evaluate how well it
approximates observed contracts. We assume that shareholders want to implement a certain
action fe; g and that they have done so in the observed contract.15 Under this assumption,
we can reformulate the shareholders optimization problem (4.2.3) to (4.2.5) as follows (see
15This calibration method has rst been used by Dittmann and Maug (2007). It is the rst stage of the two-stage
procedure in Grossman and Hart for the e¤ort/volatility level implemented by the observed contract. We cannot
repeat this task for alternative e¤ort/volatility levels, because this would require knowledge of the production
and the cost function. Therefore we cannot analyze the optimal level of e¤ort or volatility (i.e., the second stage
in Grossman and Hart, 1983).
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Appendix D for the derivation):
min
c0;c1;c2
E [W T (PT jc0; c1; c2)] (3.5.1)
subject to E [V (W T (PT jc0; c1; c2))] = E
h
V (W dT (PT ))
i
(3.5.2)
PPSua(W T (PT jc0; c1; c2)) = PPSua(W dT (PT )) (3.5.3)
(W T (PT jc0; c1; c2)) = (W dT (PT )); (3.5.4)
where W dT (PT ) = 
d+ndSPT +n
d
OmaxfPT  Kd; 0g is the observed contract (d for "data") that
we construct from the data as described in Section 3.3. Intuitively, we search for the contract
WT (PT jc0; c1; c2) with shape (3.2.10) that achieves three objectives. First it provides the same
e¤ort and risk-taking incentives to the agent as the observed contract (conditions (3.5.3) and
(3.5.4)). Second it provides the agent with the same utility as the observed contract (condition
(3.5.2)), and third it is as cheap as possible for the rm (objective (3.5.1)).16 If our model
is correct and descriptive of the data, the cheapest contract found in this optimization will
be identical to the observed contract. If the new contract di¤ers substantially, the observed
contract is not e¢ cient according to the model: it is possible to nd a cheaper contract that
implements the same e¤ort and the same strategy as the observed contract. In this case, either
compensation practice is ine¢ cient or the model is incorrect. In both cases, the model is not
descriptive of the data.
Figure 3.5.1 shows our calibration results for a representative CEO.17 The solid line
represents the optimal contract W T that solves the optimization problem (3.5.1) to (3.5.4),
and the dotted line is the observed contract W dT . The gure shows the CEOs end-of-period
16Note that we have as many constraints in problem (3.5.1) to (3.5.4) as we have parameters, so that there are
no degrees of freedom left to minimize costs. Therefore, we solve a system of three equations (3.5.2) to (3.5.4) in
three unknowns for every CEO in our sample. The resulting contract has the optimal shape and therefore must
be cheaper than the observed contract.
17For each parameter (observed salary d, observed stock holdings ndS , observed option holdings n
d
O, wealth W0,
rm size P0, stock return volatility , time to maturity T , and moneyness K=P0) and each CEO we calculate the
absolute percentage di¤erence between individual and median value. Then we calculate the maximum di¤erence
for each CEO and select the CEO for whom this maximum di¤erence is smallest.
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Figure 3.5.1: The gure shows end of period wealth WT for the observed contract (dotted line),
the optimal CRRA contract with risk-taking incentives (solid line), and the optimal CRRA
contract without risk-taking incentives (dashed line) for a representative CEO whose parameters
are close to the median of the sample. The parameters are  = $1:1m, nS = 0:33%, nO = 0:57%
for the observed contract. Initial non-rm wealth is W0 = $15:6m. P0 = $2:8bn,  = 27:9%,
and K=P0 = 49%, T = 4:2 years, rf = 4:4%, d = 1:8%. All calculations are for  = 3.
wealth WT as a function of end-of-period stock price PT which we express as a multiple of the
beginning-of-period stock price P0. The optimal contract with risk-taking incentives protects the
CEO from losses. It provides the CEO with a at wealth of $24m if the stock price falls below
49% of the initial stock price. Intuitively, limiting the downside for bad outcomes provides better
(i.e., cheaper) risk-taking incentives than rewarding good outcomes. In the region between 49%
and 70% of the initial stock price, the contract is increasing and convex. For larger stock prices,
the contract is concave. The reason for the concavity is the CEOs decreasing marginal utility:
the richer the CEO is, the less interested he is in additional wealth.
As a benchmark, we also calibrate the optimal contract without risk-taking incentives
from Dittmann and Maug (2007); it is the broken line in Figure 3.5.1. For this purpose, we solve
the optimization problem (3.5.1) to (3.5.3) without the volatility incentive constraint (3.5.4) and
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use the contract shape W T (PT jc0; c1) = (c0 + c1 lnPT )1= . We call this contract the benchmark
contract or the CRRA-contract while we refer to the contract from the full model as the RTI
contract or, more precisely, the CRRA-RTI contract. Figure 3.5.1 shows that the benchmark
contract is globally concave and puts the agents entire wealth at risk. As a consequence, it
makes the agent extremely averse to taking additional risk. For the full sample, Table 2, Panel
B shows descriptive statistics for the incentives to avoid risk, , for the benchmark contract.
For  = 3, average  is 9:43 compared to 1:87 in the observed contract.18 With the benchmark
contract, the agent will therefore be willing to increase rm risk by one percentage point only
if the additional project increases rm value by at least 9:43%. Note that by construction the
RTI contract has the same  as the observed contract.
The gure suggests that the model with risk-taking incentives (solid line) ts the ob-
served contract (dotted line) much better than the model without risk-taking incentives (broken
line). To quantify this visual impression, we calculate for both models the average distance
between the contract W T predicted by the model and the observed contract W
d
T :
D1 = E
 W T (PT ) W dT (PT )
W dT (PT )
!
: (3.5.5)
We recognize that the observed contract we construct in Section 3.3 is a stark simplication
of the contracts used in practice, especially because typical contracts contain several grants of
stock options with di¤erent maturities and di¤erent strike prices. Contracts are therefore in
general not piecewise linear with just one kink but have a more complicated shape. To address
18For 94% of all CEO- combinations, risk-avoidance  is higher in the RTI contract than in the observed
contract (not shown in the table). The remaining 6% mostly occur for  = 6 and are very likely due to to
numerical problems, because the benchmark contract is much steeper for small values of PT for  = 6 than it is
for  = 3. When the contract approaches zero, di¤erences between very small and very large numbers occur in
the numerical routines that cannot be handled well numerically. This is also the reason why the 90% quantile of
 is lower for  = 6 than for  = 0:5 or  = 3. We therefore conclude that risk-taking incentives are always costly
in our model and that rms will never choose a contract that makes the CEO risk-seeking.
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this caveat, we consider a second distance metric
D2 = E
 W T (PT ) W smthT (PT )
W smthT (PT )
!
; (3.5.6)
where W smthT (PT ) sums up the expected value of all option grants held by the CEO. For a grant
that has a maturity larger than T , this is just the Black Scholes value for the remaining maturity
given PT . For a grant that has a maturity smaller than T , we calculate the expected value of
the option at maturity given P0 and PT and assume that this amount is invested at the risk-free
rate for the remaining time between maturity and T . In this way, we obtain a smooth contract
for all CEOs who have at least two di¤erent option grants. For CEOs with only one option
grant, W smthT (PT ) = W
d
T (PT ). We explain the construction and calculation of W
smth
T in more
detail in Appendix E. For the representative CEO shown in Figure 1, the distance is 5:2% for the
contract with risk-taking incentives and 22:2% for the contract without risk-taking incentives.
The representative CEO has only one option grant, so both distance measures have the same
value in this case.
Table 3, Panel A shows the results for all CEOs in our sample. The left part of the table
describes the optimal contract with risk-taking incentives for three values of constant relative
risk-aversion . We do not tabulate the parameters c0, c1, and c2, as they cannot be interpreted
independently from each other. Instead, the table shows mean and median of a few key variables
that describe the contract. These variables include the two distance measures D1 and D2 from
(3.5.5) and (3.5.6) and the managers minimum wealth (minW T (PT )) scaled by non-rm wealth
W0. In addition, the table shows two probabilities. First, the kink quantile is the probability
that the contract pays out the minimum wage in the at region of the contract; formally, this is
Pr(PT    c12c2 ) from equation (3.2.10). Second, the inection quantile is the probability mass
below the point where the contract curvature changes from convex to concave.
Table 3 demonstrates that the optimal contract provides the agent with comprehensive
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downside protection. For  = 3, the median minimum wealth is 1:4 times the initial wealth
W0. Only for 0:1% of the CEOs in our sample is the minimum wealth lower than their observed
non-rm wealth W0. The contract pays out the minimum wage for the worst outcomes with
a median probability of 16:1%. The median inection quantile is 32:5%, so that the contract
is convex for mediocre performance between the 16:1% quantile and the 32:5% quantile and
concave for good performance above the 32:5% quantile.
Table 3, Panel A also shows the savings rms could realize when they switch from the
observed contract to the optimal contract. These savings are dened as
savings =
h
E

W dT (PT )

  E (W T (PT ))
i
=E

W dT (PT )

:
For  = 3, mean (median) savings are 10:4% (6:9%). The mean distance D1 between observed
contract and optimal contract is 8:0%, and the mean distance D2 is 8:6%. For lower values
of risk aversion , we obtain a better t: For  = 0:5, the average distance D1 is only 2:5%.
Contracts are then convex over a larger range of stock prices from the 1:7% quantile to the
77:7% quantile for the median CEO. Savings from recontracting are smaller for lower values of
risk aversion , because savings are generated by e¢ cient risk sharing which is less important if
the CEO is less risk averse. Conversely, we nd a worse t for higher values of risk aversion .
The region of convexity shrinks relative to our benchmark case  = 3 and the distance to the
observed contract increases according to all measures.
The right part of Table 3 displays the results for the benchmark model without risk-
taking incentives. This contract does not contain any downside protection, so the CEO can
potentially lose all her wealth. Moreover, it is globally concave for all CEOs if  > 1, so that
the kink quantile and the inection quantile are both zero. Due to convergence problems, the
sample for the two sets of results in Table 3, Panel A is not the same. We therefore report the
numbers again in Panel B for the subsample of CEOs for whom we obtain convergence for both
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models. This panel shows that the model with risk-taking incentives approximates observed
contracts much better than the benchmark model. For  = 3, the average distance D1 is 28:3%
for the benchmark model compared to 8:0% for the RTI model. The savings from recontracting
are also much higher for the benchmark model than for the RTI model. The benchmark model
suggests that shareholders leave 34:5% of contracting costs on the table while the RTI model
puts this number at 10:4% only. These numbers suggest that risk-taking incentives play an
important role in observed compensation contracts. Observed contracts appear markedly less
ine¢ cient when risk-taking incentives are taken into account.
3.6 Robustness checks
3.6.1 Constant absolute risk aversion
The CEOs attitude to risk is central to our model. So far we have assumed that the CEOs
preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). To see whether our results are robust
to alternative assumptions on CEO risk aversion, we repeat our analysis from Table 3 with
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), so that V CARA (WT ) =   exp ( WT ) replaces V (WT )
in equation (4.2.2). Taking the rst derivative and plugging the result into equation (3.2.9) from
Proposition 1 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Optimal CARA contract): If the agent exhibits constant absolute risk aversion
with parameter , the optimal contract has the following functional form:
W T =
8>><>>:
1
 log



c0 + c1 lnPT + c2(lnPT )
2
	
if ln(PT ) >   c12c2
1
 log
n

h
c0   c
2
1
4c2
io
if ln(PT )    c12c2
(3.6.1)
To maintain comparability with our previous results, we calculate the coe¢ cient of
absolute risk aversion  from  so that both utility functions exhibit the same risk-aversion at
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the expected end-of-period wealth. More precisely, we set  = =(W0 exp(rfT ) + 0), where 0
is the market value of the managers contract. Results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 demonstrates that all our results continue to hold with CARA utility. In par-
ticular, the CARA-RTI model generates a much better t than the CARA model, it guarantees
a minimum payout that is always higher than the CEOs nonrm wealth, and it is convex for
intermediate payouts and concave for good payouts.
3.6.2 Sample selection bias
Our data set is subject to a moderate survivorship bias, as we require that CEOs are covered
by the ExecuComp database for at least ve years. Table 1 demonstrates that younger and
less successful CEOs are underrepresented in our data set. We therefore divide our sample in
quintiles according to four variables: CEOsnon-rm wealth W0, CEO age, rm value P0, and
the past ve yearsstock return. Table 5 displays for these subsamples the average distance D1,
and, in the last line, the p-value of the Wilcoxon test that the average distance is identical in
the rst and the fth quintile. This analysis is done for  = 3.
The table shows that the model t is worse for younger and less wealthy CEOs. For
the 20% youngest and the 20% least wealthy CEOs, we nd an average distance of 11:7% and,
respectively, 11:4% compared to 8:0% for the full sample (see Table 3). Given that our sample
is biased towards older and more wealthy CEOs, the average distance in the unbiased sample
would be somewhat higher than shown in Table 3. We nd the opposite e¤ect, however, for
past performance: the 20% best-performing rms have an average distance of 10:6%. As we
oversample rms with good performance, the average distance in Table 3 should be adjusted
downwards. Altogether, the e¤ect of the sample bias on our results is therefore small.
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3.7 Optimal contracts when CEOs are loss averse
Our analysis in Section 3.5 shows that the RTI model can explain observed contracts reason-
ably well and certainly much better than the benchmark model without risk-taking incentives.
Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) propose an alternative model without risk-taking incentives
where the manager is loss averse. They also calibrate the model to the data and show that it
ts the data reasonably well. In this section, we therefore compare the CRRA-RTI model and
the loss-aversion model (henceforth: LA model) and investigate whether the LA model can be
further improved by taking into account risk-taking incentives.
3.7.1 The standard loss-aversion model
Loss-aversion preferences are given by (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
V LA (WT ) =
8>><>>:
 
WT  WR

if WT WR
   WR  WT  if WT < WR ; where 0 < ;  < 1 and   1: (3.7.1)
Here, WR is the agents reference wealth level. Payouts above this level are coded as gains,
while payouts below are coded as losses. The agent is risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking
over losses, and losses receive a higher weight ( > 1) than gains. The utility ULA(WT ; e) =
V LA(WT )  C(e) then replaces equation (4.2.2). Following Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010),
we use  =  = 0:88 and  = 2:25 and parameterize reference wealth WR by
WR2006 =W0 + 2005 +  MV (nS2005; nO2005; P2006);
where MV (:) denotes the market value of last years stock and option portfolio evaluated at
this years market price. Reference wealth therefore equals the sum of nonrm wealth W0, last
years xed salary , and a portion  of todays market value of the stock and options held last
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Figure 3.7.1: The gure shows end-of-period wealth WT of three di¤erent contracts for the same
representative CEO as Figure 1. The dotted line shows the observed contract; the solid line
displays the optimal CRRA contract with risk-taking incentives for  = 3; and the dashed line
shows the optimal LA contract for  = 0:1.
period. Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) show that the model ts the data best for  = 0:1
and we therefore consider three values of : 0:1, 0:5, and 0:9.
Figure 3.7.1 shows the LA contract for  = 0:1 together with the CRRA-RTI con-
tract for  = 3 and the observed contract for the representative CEO. Visual inspection shows
that both models t the observed contract reasonably well. However, there are two important
di¤erences: First, while the LA contract is convex over all realistic stock price outcomes, the
CRRA-RTI contract is concave for medium and large stock prices. Second, the LA contract
features a discontinous jump for very low stock prices from a payout just above the reference
point to the lowest possible payout of zero. As a consequence, the LA model approximates
the observed contract poorly for very small stock prices, but seems to do a better job than the
CRRA-RTI model for high stock prices.
Table 6 displays our results for the LA model for three di¤erent values of reference
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wealth as parameterized by . In addition to mean and median of the two distance metrics D1
and D2, and the savings, the table shows the average probability that the terminal payout is
zero (the "jump quantile") and the inection quantile where the contract changes from convex
to concave. We nd that the LA model with  = 0:1 approximates the observed contract better
than the CRRA-RTI model with  = 3. The median distance D1 is 4:3% for the LA model
compared with 6:9% for the CRRA-RTI model (see Table 3).19 For higher reference wealth,
however, the LA model is considerably worse than the RTI model for any of the risk-aversion
parameters considered ( = 0:5, 3, and 6). The reason is that the probability that the CEO
ends up with zero wealth is low only for very low reference wealth. For  = 0:5, the average
jump quantile is 3:47% and for  = 0:9 it is 9:36%. We therefore conclude that the LA model is
superior only for a rather specic choice of parameterization. In contrast, the CRRA-RTI model
o¤ers a reasonable approximation of the observed contract that is more robust to changes in the
preference parameter.
3.7.2 Risk-taking incentives in the loss-aversion model
CEO preferences are di¤erent in the loss-aversion model compared to the CRRA model. Hence,
risk-taking incentives di¤er between the two models. Table 8, Panel A displays descriptive
statistics of risk avoidance  in the LA model for the observed contract. A comparison with
Table 2, Panel A shows that risk avoidance in the observed contract is considerably lower if the
CEO is loss-averse than if he exhibits constant relative risk aversion. In the LA-model with
 = 0:1, mean and median  are both close to zero, and 48:7% of the CEOs have negative , i.e.
incentives to take on too much risk. For larger values of ,  increases somewhat but is always
much lower than the average 1:87 we nd for the CRRA-model with  = 3.
19Across all models and all specications, the CRRA-RTI model with  = 0:5 has the best t. However, we
do not regard the CRRA model with  = 0:5 as reasonable, because the model then implies unrealistic portfolio
decisions. A CEO with  = 0:5 would borrow heavily and invest much more than his entire wealth into the market
portfolio.
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Table 7, Panel B shows similar statistics for  in the LA contract. Risk-taking incentives
do not di¤er much between observed contracts and optimal contracts in the LA model. On
average,  decreases somewhat for  = 0:1 and  = 0:5, and increases slightly for  = 0:9. This
is in stark contrast to the CRRA model, where the optimal contract generates severely higher
 compared to the observed contract (see Table 2). The reason is that the cost e¤ective way to
provide e¤ort incentives in the CRRA-model is to punish the agent for very low outcomes, and
this policy severely increases risk avoidance. In the LA model, on the other hand, cost e¤ective
e¤ort incentives consist not only of sticks but also of carrots in the form of convex payouts for
medium and high outcomes. While the sticks reduce e¤ort incentives, the carrots increase them,
and the overall e¤ect can go in both directions. As a consequence, our assumption that the
contract chosen by the rm does not make the CEO risk-seeking does not hold in general for
the LA model.
To analyze risk-taking incentives in the loss-aversion model in more detail, we distin-
guish six cases, depending on whether or not risk-avoidance is higher in the LA model than in
the observed contract and on whether one or both of the risk-avoidance measures are positive.
Table 7, Panel C denes these six cases and displays how often each of them applies for the three
di¤erent values of . There are only two cases (cases 1 and 4) where risk-taking incentives are
unambiguously worse in the LA model than in the observed contract, so that augmenting the
model with risk-taking incentives might improve its t. In cases 2 and 5, risk-taking incentives
are better (i.e.  is closer to zero) in the LA model than in the observed contract, so there is no
room for improvements.
The only case that is consistent with our assumptions is case 1. Note that for the
CRRA model with  = 3, 99:3% of all CEOs fall into this category (see Table 2). For this case,
we derive the shape of the optimal LA-RTI contract in Appendix C and then calibrate it to
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the observed contract for those CEOs where case 1 applies. The results are shown in Table 8
which is structured similarly to Table 3. The table shows that the probability that the CEO
ends up with zero wealth is much lower for the LA-RTI model compared to the LA model. For
 = 0:5, this probability decreases from 6:7% to 3:1% on average. Removing the punishment for
poor outcomes increases risk-taking incentives, and the LA-RTI model has a slightly better t
than the LA model if   0:5. For  = 0:9, however, the average distance metrics are higher for
the LA-RTI model compared to the LA model. In many cases, the optimal LA-RTI contract
has a poor t, because it is at at the reference wealth for small and intermediate payouts and
takes o¤ with strong convexity only for high payouts. Altogether we therefore conclude that the
LA-RTI model does not yield any signicant improvements over the LA model. We conclude
that risk-taking incentives are less of an issue if managers are loss-averse, because the LA model
does not reduce risk-taking incentives nearly as much as the CRRA model.
3.8 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze a principal-agent model in which the agent not only exerts e¤ort but
also determines the rms strategy and thereby its stock return volatility. In this model, the
choice of a more risky rm strategy has two e¤ects on the managers compensation. The rst,
obvious e¤ect is that higher volatility makes future payo¤s more risky, so that the utility a
risk-averse manager derives from restricted stock drops. This e¤ect has already been analyzed
extensively in the literature (see Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia, 1991; Guay, 1999; Carpenter,
2000; Ross, 2004). The second e¤ect that has so far been neglected by the empirical literature
is that a more risky rm strategy also a¤ects expected rm value. In a situation where the
rm takes ine¢ ciently low risk, risk-taking increases rm value and therefore, via the CEOs
equity portfolio, CEO wealth. While this is the relevant situation in equilibrium when the
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CEO is risk-averse, there is another case that might apply out of equilibrium or for alternative
preference specications, like loss-aversion. Then the rm takes ine¢ ciently high risk and risk-
taking reduces rm value and CEO wealth. Therefore, it is not enough to just look at the direct
impact of an increase in risk on a managers compensation package (vega) in order to determine
his attitude towards an increase in risk. The indirect e¤ect via a change in rm value and the
managers equity portfolio (delta) must also be taken into account. Our paper provides - to the
best of our knowledge - the rst empirical analysis of a full principal agent model that takes both
e¤ects into account. We also propose a new measure of risk-taking incentives that combines the
CEOs preferences and the curvature of the contract and predicts which risky projects the CEO
will adopt.
Our model predicts an optimal contract that has a limited downside and a steep slope
for intermediate outcomes. It is at for low performance, increasing and convex for intermediate
performance, and increasing and concave for high performance. The optimal contract is there-
fore reminiscent of a standard bonus scheme that is capped from below as well as from above
(see Murphy, 2001, and Healy, 1985). Our calibration results show that the model contract
approximates the observed contract well. Across all CEOs, the average distance between the
two contracts is 8:0% for a CRRA parameter of 3. In contrast, a model that does not take into
account risk-taking incentives di¤ers from the observed contract by 28:8%.
We also calibrate the loss-aversion (LA) model from Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010)
to our data and nd an average distance of 5:8% for a low reference point. For higher reference
points, however, the model is considerably worse than the risk-aversion model with risk-taking
incentives (CRRA-RTI). Altogether, it is therefore unclear which model is more successful. The
main di¤erence between the two models is that the LA model predicts a discontinuous jump
to the lowest possible payout for poor performance while the CRRARTI model predicts a at
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payout. On the other hand, the LA model is convex over all realistic outcomes whereas the
CRRARTI model becomes concave for high outcomes. Note that observed contracts are linear
for high outcomes, so both models necessarily have an approximation error. We also show that
the t of the LA model does not improve much (and sometimes even gets worse) when risk-
taking incentives are taken into account. While risk-taking incentives are neccessary to explain
observed contracts in the risk-aversion model, they are not needed in the loss-aversion model.
A limitation of our analysis is that our model is static and considers only two points
in time: the time of contract negotiation and the time when the nal stock price is realized.
Realistically, a bad or unlucky CEO is likely to be replaced if the stock price drops by more than
50%.20 Such a dismissal has two consequences. First it might a¤ect rm performance if the new
CEO is more skilled than the ousted CEO. This e¤ect is beyond the scope of our model, as at
least two periods are necessary to describe it. Second, dismissals negatively a¤ect the payout of
the ousted CEO, mainly because it reduces the CEOs future employment opportunities. Our
model predicts a at pay for low levels of stock price, so this negative e¤ect of a dismissal is
undesirable. Consequently, our analysis can also be interpreted as a justication of severance
pay that compensates the manager for his loss in human capital (see Yermack, 2006).
3.9 Tables and Figures
20Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Kaplan (1994), and Jenter and Kanaan (2010), among others, analyze the
sensitivity of dismissals to past stock price performance.
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 Table 1: Description of the dataset 
This table displays mean, median, standard deviation, and the 10% and 90% quantile of the variables in our 
dataset. Stock holdings nS and option holdings nO are expressed as a percentage of all outstanding shares. 
Panel A describes our sample of 727 CEOs from 2006. Panel B describes all 1,490 executives in the 
ExecuComp universe who are CEO in 2006. 
 
Panel A: Data set with 727 U.S. CEOs 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile 
Stock (%) nS 1.83% 4.94% 0.04% 0.32% 4.68% 
Options (%) nO 1.37% 1.62% 0.14% 0.92% 3.17% 
Base Salary ($m)  1.64 4.47 0.51 1.04 2.43 
Value of Contract ($m) π0 159.63 1,700.06 4.58 24.97 172.74 
Non-firm Wealth ($m) W0 62.8 667.0 2.5 12.0 72.2 
Firm Value ($m) P0 9,294 22,777 377 2,387 20,880 
Strike Price ($m) K 6,829 19,803 269 1,539 13,799 
Moneyness (%) K/P0 70.1% 21.7% 41.2% 72.0% 100.0% 
Maturity (years) T 4.6 1.4 2.8 4.4 6.4 
Stock Volatility (%) σ 30.0% 13.4% 16.4% 28.3% 45.5% 
Dividend Rate (%) d 1.24% 2.25% 0.00% 0.63% 3.30% 
CEO Age (years)  56.0 6.8 47 56 64 
Stock Return 2001-5 (%) 11.8% 15.6% -5.7% 11.4% 28.7% 
 
Panel B: All 1,490 ExecuComp CEOs in 2006 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile 
Stock (%) nS 1.95% 6.26% 0.02% 0.28% 4.22% 
Options (%) nO 1.26% 1.57% 0.08% 0.79% 2.88% 
Base Salary ($m)  1.68 4.01 0.48 1.02 2.63 
Firm Value ($m) P0 8,840 24,760 339 2,091 17,796 
CEO Age (years)  55.1 7.1 46 55 64 
Stock Return 2001-5 (%) 10.5% 23.2% -13.8% 9.8% 34.1% 
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 Table 2: Risk avoidance with Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) 
This table displays descriptive statistics for risk avoidance ρ from equation (3.4.7) for five different values 
of the CRRA-parameter γ. Panel A shows results for the observed contract. Panel B displays results for the 
optimal CRRA-contract that does not take risk-taking into account. 
 
Panel A: Observed contract 
 
γ Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
10% 
Quantile 
Median 
90% 
Quantile 
Proportion  
with ρ > 0 
0.5 727 0.19 0.39 -0.30 0.19 0.64 70.2% 
1 727 0.62 0.56 -0.08 0.59 1.31 87.5% 
2 727 1.33 0.86 0.30 1.25 2.43 96.8% 
3 727 1.87 1.07 0.60 1.75 3.38 99.3% 
6 727 2.91 1.50 1.13 2.68 4.88 99.7% 
 
Panel B: Optimal CRRA-contract without risk-taking incentives 
 
γ Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
10% 
Quantile 
Median 
90% 
Quantile 
Proportion  
with ρ > 0 
0.5 727 1.32 0.63 0.62 1.26 2.11 99.9% 
1 726 2.40 1.12 0.99 2.40 3.71 100.0% 
2 727 5.74 18.92 3.64 6.71 8.58 99.9% 
3 726 9.43 17.21 6.75 10.34 13.02 99.7% 
6 652 12.04 7.25 0.02 15.02 18.77 99.4% 
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 Table 3: Optimal CRRA contracts  
with and without risk-taking incentives 
This table describes the optimal contracts according to the CRRA-RTI model from equation (10) and the 
CRRA model from Dittmann and Maug (2007) for three different values of the CRRA parameter γ. The 
table displays mean and median of six measures that describe the optimal contract. The two distance 
metrics D1 and D2 are defined in equations (3.5.5) and (3.5.6). Savings are the difference in compensation 
costs between observed contract and optimal contract expressed as a percentage of costs of the observed 
contract, (π0
d
 – π0*)/π0
d
. Minimum wealth is the lowest possible payout of the contract expressed as a 
multiple of the CEO’s non-firm wealth W0. The kink quantile is the probability that the end-of-period stock 
price PT is smaller than the point where the wage schedule W(PT) starts to increase. The inflection quantile 
is the probability that the end-of-period stock price PT is smaller than the point where the wage scheme 
turns from convex to concave. Panel A displays these statistics for all CEOs in our sample. The number of 
observations varies across different values of γ and across the two models due to numerical problems and 
because we exclude all CEO-γ-combinations for the CRRA-RTI model for which the observed contract 
implies negative risk-avoidance ρ from equation (3.4.7). Panel B shows results for those CEO-γ-
combinations where we obtain convergence for both models. 
 
Panel A: All results 
  CRRA-RTI-Model   CRRA-Model 
    γ = 0.5 γ = 3 γ = 6   γ = 0.5 γ = 3 γ = 6 
Distance D1 mean 2.5% 8.0% 13.1%   14.2% 28.8% 36.5% 
 median 1.9% 6.9% 10.2%  12.1% 27.9% 30.9% 
Distance D2 mean 5.8% 8.6% 13.1%   12.7% 26.2% 35.6% 
  median 4.0% 7.4% 9.7%   10.9% 25.2% 30.3% 
Savings mean 0.1% 10.4% 30.6%  2.1% 34.7% 53.7% 
 median 0.0% 6.9% 27.1%  1.1% 32.7% 54.3% 
Minimum wealth mean 3.1 1.7 1.3   0.0 0.0 0.0 
 median 1.3 1.4 1.2  0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Prop < 1 11.9% 0.1% 0.8%   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Kink quantile mean 4.8% 19.6% 22.4%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 median 1.7% 16.1% 19.5%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Inflection quantile mean 78.1% 34.9% 31.4%   2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
  median 77.7% 32.5% 29.3%   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Observations   388 688 373   727 726 652 
 
Panel B: Results where numerical routine converges for both models 
  CRRA-RTI-Model   CRRA-Model 
    γ = 0.5 γ = 3 γ = 6   γ = 0.5 γ = 3 γ = 6 
Distance D1 mean 2.5% 8.0% 13.5%  13.8% 28.3% 27.0% 
 median 1.9% 6.9% 10.7%  11.9% 27.5% 25.0% 
Distance D2 mean 5.8% 8.6% 13.5%  13.0% 25.7% 26.7% 
  median 4.0% 7.4% 10.2%  11.1% 24.8% 24.8% 
Savings mean 0.1% 10.4% 31.2%  1.7% 34.5% 54.0% 
 median 0.0% 6.9% 28.2%  1.0% 32.1% 55.3% 
Observations   388 688 334  388 688 334 
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 Table 4: Optimal contracts for CARA utility 
This table contains the results from repeating our analysis from Table 3 under the assumption that the CEO 
has CARA utility. For three different values of γ, we calculate the CEO’s coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion ρ as 
0 0/ ( exp( ) )fW r T    , where 0 is the market value of his observed compensation 
package and W0 is his initial non-firm wealth. The table displays mean and median of six measures that 
describe the optimal contract. The two distance metrics D1 and D2 are defined in equations (22) and (23). 
Savings are the difference in compensation costs between observed contract and optimal contract expressed 
as a percentage of costs of the observed contract, (π0
d
 – π0*)/π0
d
. Minimum wealth is the lowest possible 
payout of the contract expressed as a multiple of the CEO’s nonfirm wealth W0. The kink quantile is the 
probability that the end-of-period stock price PT is smaller than the point where the wage schedule W(PT) 
starts to increase. The inflection quantile is the probability that the end-of-period stock price PT is smaller 
than the point where the wage scheme turns from convex to concave. The number of observations varies 
across different values of γ due to numerical problems and because we exclude all CEO-γ-combinations for 
the CARA-RTI model for which the observed contract implies negative risk-avoidance ρ from equation 
(17). Results are shown for those CEO-γ-combinations only where we obtain convergence for both models. 
 
  CARA-RTI-Model   CARA-Model 
    γ = 0.5 γ = 3 γ = 6   γ = 0.5 γ = 3 γ = 6 
Distance D1 mean 6.8% 9.3% 12.7%  22.2% 23.1% 24.6% 
 median 5.7% 8.9% 12.4%  19.7% 22.6% 24.3% 
Distance D2 mean 9.2% 9.8% 12.8%  20.5% 20.4% 23.1% 
  median 7.7% 9.1% 11.9%  18.1% 19.5% 22.7% 
Savings mean 2.4% 15.1% 25.8%  6.3% 27.4% 39.9% 
 median 0.9% 12.1% 24.8%  3.7% 26.0% 40.2% 
Minimum wealth mean 2.9 2.2 2.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
 median 1.5 1.4 1.4  0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Prop < 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Kink quantile mean 20.7% 22.9% 18.2%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 median 17.2% 19.3% 14.7%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Inflection quantile mean 54.6% 36.6% 26.1%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  median 52.6% 33.7% 22.8%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Observations   279 419 594  279 419 594 
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 Table 5: Model fit for subsamples 
This table shows mean distance D1 from equation (22) for quintiles formed according to four variables: 
initial non-firm wealth W0, CEO age, firm value P0, and the past five year stock return (from the start of 
2001 to the end of 2005). The risk-aversion parameter γ is set equal to 3. The last row shows the p-value of 
the two-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test that the average D1 is identical in Quintile 1 and Quintile 5. 
 
Quin
-tile 
Wealth W0  
(in $m) 
  CEO Age   
Firm Value P0  
(in $m) 
  
Stock return  
2001-2005 
Mean D1   Mean D1   Mean D1   Mean D1 
1 2.6 11.4%  41.9 11.7%  386 8.7%  -18.8% 7.5% 
2 6.6 7.8%  48.1 9.4%  1,135 8.5%  3.6% 6.8% 
3 12.3 7.5%  52.5 8.1%  2,358 8.1%  11.3% 7.5% 
4 26.1 6.8%  57.0 7.0%  5,648 7.2%  18.9% 8.5% 
5 270.1 6.8%  64.6 7.6%  32,685 7.8%  43.5% 10.6% 
P-Value Q1-Q5 0.0000   0.0040   0.9583   0.0001 
 
 
Table 6:  
Optimal loss aversion contracts without risk-taking incentives 
This table describes the optimal contract according to the LA model from Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) 
for three different levels of reference wealth W
R
 parameterized by θ. The table displays mean and median of 
five measures that describe the optimal contract. The two distance metrics D1 and D2 are defined in 
equations (3.5.5) and (3.5.6). Savings are the difference in compensation costs between observed contract 
and optimal contract expressed as a percentage of costs of the observed contract, (π0
d
 – π0*)/π0
d
. The jump 
quantile is the probability that the end-of-period stock price PT is smaller than the point where the contract 
jumps from the lowest possible payout to some payout above the reference wealth. The inflection quantile 
is the probability that the end-of-period stock price PT is smaller than the point where the wage scheme 
turns from convex to concave. The number of observations varies across different values of θ due to 
numerical problems. 
 
    θ = 0.1 θ = 0.5 θ = 0.9 
Distance D1 mean 5.8% 19.0% 31.7% 
 median 4.3% 15.9% 29.0% 
Distance D2 mean 6.4% 17.6% 28.6% 
  median 4.5% 15.4% 26.3% 
Savings mean 0.8% 4.8% 9.5% 
 median 0.1% 3.8% 8.4% 
Jump quantile mean 0.25% 3.47% 9.36% 
  median 0.00% 1.80% 7.79% 
Inflection quantile mean  100% 100% 100% 
 median 100% 100% 100% 
Observations   715 676 586 
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 Table 7: Risk avoidance when managers are loss averse 
This table displays descriptive statistics for risk avoidance ρ from equation (17) for three different levels of 
reference wealth W
R
 parameterized by θ. Panel A shows results for the observed contract. Panel B displays 
results for the optimal LA contract that does not take risk-taking into account. Panel C defines six cases for 
changes in risk avoidance from the observed contract to the optimal LA contract and reports the relative 
frequency with which these cases apply for each of the three levels of reference wealth. 
 
Panel A: Observed contract 
 
θ Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
10% 
Quantile 
Median 
90% 
Quantile 
Proportion  
with ρ > 0 
0.1 727 -0.04 0.28 -0.44 0.01 0.27 51.3% 
0.5 727 0.27 0.37 -0.24 0.31 0.72 76.2% 
0.9 727 0.41 0.38 -0.12 0.46 0.87 84.6% 
 
Panel B: Optimal LA contract 
 
θ Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
10% 
Quantile 
Median 
90% 
Quantile 
Proportion  
with ρ > 0 
0.1 715 -0.16 0.63 -0.67 -0.22 0.25 30.8% 
0.5 676 -0.13 1.01 -1.06 -0.34 0.88 34.0% 
0.9 586 0.55 1.38 -1.30 0.62 2.21 71.8% 
 
Panel C: Changes in risk avoidance 
 
θ Obs. 
Case 1: 
 
 
0
obs
LA obs


 
Case 2: 
[ , )

 
0
0
obs
LA obs


 
Case 3: 


0
0
obs
LA


 
Case 4: 

 
0
obs
LA obs


 
Case 5: 
( , ]

 
0
0
obs
LA obs


 
Case 6: 


0
0
obs
LA


 
0.1 715 13.0% 10.5% 27.6% 29.5% 12.2% 7.3% 
0.5 676 15.2% 11.2% 50.7% 12.9% 2.4% 7.5% 
0.9 586 44.0% 17.6% 24.2% 2.7% 1.2% 10.2% 
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 Table 8: Optimal LA contracts with and without risk-taking incentives 
This table describes the optimal contracts according to the LA-RTI model from Appendix C and the LA 
model from Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) for three different levels of reference wealth W
R
 
parameterized by θ. The table displays mean and median of five measures that describe the optimal contract. 
The two distance metrics D1 and D2 are defined in equations (3.5.5) and (3.5.6). Savings are the difference 
in compensation costs between observed contract and optimal contract expressed as a percentage of costs of 
the observed contract, (π0
d
 – π0*)/π0
d
. The jump quantile is the probability that the end-of-period stock price 
PT is smaller than the point where the contract jumps from the lowest possible payout to some payout above 
the reference wealth. The inflection quantile is the probability that the end-of-period stock price PT is 
smaller than the point where the wage scheme turns from convex to concave. The number of observations 
is small and varies across different values of θ, because we only consider the CEOs from Case 1 in Table 2, 
Panel C. In the other cases, either our model assumptions are violated or the optimal LA and LA-RTI 
contracts are identical. We also lose some observations due to numerical problems. 
 
  LA-RTI-Model   LA-Model 
    θ = 0.1 θ = 0.5 θ = 0.9   θ = 0.1 θ = 0.5 θ = 0.9 
Distance D1 mean 2.1% 20.6% 43.0%  2.2% 21.8% 37.3% 
 median 0.7% 17.4% 37.7%  1.0% 19.4% 37.1% 
Distance D2 mean 2.2% 18.9% 37.4%  2.2% 20.0% 33.5% 
  median 0.8% 15.3% 32.3%  1.3% 17.5% 32.8% 
Savings mean 0.4% 7.3% 8.7%  1.1% 8.3% 11.2% 
 median 0.0% 7.5% 8.8%  0.0% 8.0% 10.4% 
Jump quantile mean 0.1% 3.1% 5.3%  0.3% 6.7% 14.3% 
 median 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%  0.0% 5.4% 13.5% 
Inflection quantile mean 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  median 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Observations   75 85 182  75 85 182 
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3.10 Appendix
Appendix A: First Order Approach
Note that the monotonicity constraint (3.2.4) must hold for every PT , so that it is actually a
continuum of innitely many restrictions. We rst rewrite the restriction as a function of WT .
Let h(:) be the function that maps PT into WT : WT = h(PT ). Then PT = h 1(WT ), and
dWT
dPT
(PT ) = h
0(h 1(WT )). Hence, (3.2.4) can be rewritten as
Like most of the theoretical literature on executive compensation, we work with the
rst order approach: we replace the incentive compatibility constraint (4.2.5) by the two rst-
order conditions (4.2.6) and (4.2.7). This approach is only valid if the utility which the agent
maximizes has exactly one optimum, and a su¢ cient condition is that this utility is globally
concave. In our model, this su¢ cient condition does not hold, and it is possible that the rst-
order approach is violated.
A violation of the rst-order approach has two potential consequences. First, the
agent might choose a di¤erent combination of e¤ort e and volatility  than under the observed
contract. The reason is that our optimization routine only ensures that the pair fed; dg (which
is implemented by the observed contract) remains a local optimum under the new contract, but
we do not require it to be the global optimum (see Lambert and Larcker (2004) and especially
the discussion of their Figure 1). Second, a violation of the rst-order approach implies that
there might be more than one solution to the optimization problem. We tackle the second
problem by repeating our numerical optimizations with di¤erent starting values, but we do
not nd any indication that there are multiple solutions for any CEO in our sample. In this
appendix, we therefore concentrate on the rst problem. In particular, we analyze whether
the agent has an incentive under the optimal contract W (PT ) to shirk, i.e., to choose e¤ort
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e 6= ed or volatility  6= d such that P0(e; ) < P d0 = P0(ed; d). We ignore deviations that
lead to an increase of rm value as shareholders are not likely to worry about this case. For
expositional convenience, we say that the rst-order approach is violated if the agent shirks
under the optimal contract W (PT ). In the remaining part of this appendix, we derive two
conditions under which the rst-order approach is not violated. To simplify the argument, we
normalize P0(e = 0; ) = P0(e;  = 0) = 0 and C(e = 0) = 0.
Condition 1 The agent has no incentives to choose e = 0 or  = 0, i.e., E(V (W T )jP0 = 0) <
E(V (W T )jP0 = P d0 )  C(ed) = U .
The optimal contract W T from (3.2.10) features a lower bound on the payout to the
agent. If this lower bound is higher than the agents outside option U , the agent will not exert
any e¤ort and will choose the lowest feasible volatility. Consequently, the rst-order approach is
violated. Our rst condition therefore states that this is not the case. This assumption appears
reasonable, because for the median CEO the minimum payout ($1.4m, from Table 3, Panel A for
 = 3) is only 5:6% of the expected payout ($25.0m, from Table 1). The strong rise in executive
compensation during the past three decades has been attributed to a higher outside option or
higher rents, but not to an increase in the costs of e¤ort. Therefore, Condition 1 is plausible:
No CEO will stop working when he gets a minimum payment of 5:6% of what he can expect
with normal e¤ort.
Next, we consider more general (and less extreme) deviations from the target values of
e¤ort ed and volatility d. We show that these deviations are not protable for the agent when
Condition 1 and the following condition hold:
Condition 2 The production function P0(e; ) is concave enough, i.e., it is steep enough in e
and  for e < ed and  < d and it is not too steep in e and  for e > ed and  > d.
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We distinguish three cases. First, consider a choice e  ed and   d, where e < ed
or  < d. The agent will not deviate in this way if
E(V (W T )je; )  C(e) < E(V (W T )jed; d)  C(ed):
This inequality holds if the rm value P0(e; ) associated with the deviation to (e; ) is low
enough to render this choice unattractive. This is the case if Condition 1 holds and if P0(e; )
is steep enough in e and .
The second case obtains if e < ed and  > d. To rule out such a deviation, the
punishment for the downward deviation in e must not be fully compensated by the reward for
the upward deviation in . This is achieved if P0(e; ) is steep enough in e for e < ed and not
too steep in  for  > d. A similar argument applies to the third case if e > ed,  < d.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Note that the monotonicity constraint (3.2.4) must hold for every PT , so that it is actually a
continuum of innitely many restrictions. We rst rewrite the restriction as a function of WT .
Let h(:) be the function that maps PT into WT : WT = h(PT ). Then PT = h 1(WT ), and
dWT
dPT
(PT ) = h
0(h 1(WT )). Hence, (3.2.4) can be rewritten as
h0(h 1(WT ))  0: (3.10.1)
For every WT , (3.2.4) provides one restriction, so the Lagrangian for the di¤erentiation at WT
is:
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LWT =
Z 1
0
[PT  WT ] g(PT je; )dPT + PC
Z 1
0
V (WT ; e)g(PT je; )dPT   C(e)  U

+ e
Z 1
0
V (WT )ge(PT je; )dPT   dC
de

+ 
Z 1
0
V (WT )g(PT je; )dPT
+ WT h
0(h 1(WT ));
where g(PT je; ) is the (lognormal) density function of end-of-period stock price PT :
g(PT je; ) = 1
PT
p
22T
exp[ (lnPT   (e; ))
2
22T
] (3.10.2)
with
(e; ) = lnP0(e; ) + (rf   2=2)T: (3.10.3)
ge and g are the derivatives of g(:) with respect to e and . The rst-order condition then is
g(PT je; ) = PCVWT g(PT je; ) + eVWT ge(PT je; ) + VWT g(PT je; ) (3.10.4)
+ WT
h00(h 1(WT ))
h0(h 1(WT ))
:
While there is one multiplier WT for each value of WT , the other three multipliers PC , e, and
 are the same across all values of WT . If the constraint (3.10.1) is binding, equation (3.10.4)
denes the Lagrange multiplier WT , and the solution is determined by the binding monotonicity
constraint. If (3.10.1) is not binding, WT is zero and the rst-order condition (3.10.4) simplies
with some rearranging to
1
VWT (WT )
= PC + e
ge
g
+ 
g
g
: (3.10.5)
Consequently, the solution is given by (3.10.5) as long as it is monotonically increasing, and at
otherwise.
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For the log-normal distribution (3.10.2) we get:
ge = g  lnPT   (e; )
2T
 e(e; ) (3.10.6)
g = g  [lnPT   (e; )]  (e; )  
2T + [lnPT   (e; )]2T
(2T )2
  g

= g  [lnPT   ]     + [lnPT   ]
2
3T
  g

: (3.10.7)
Substituting this into the rst-order condition (3.10.5) yields:
1
VWT (WT )
= PC + e
[lnPT   ]  e
2T
+ 

[lnPT   ]     + [lnPT   ]2
3T
  1


:
From inspection, the optimal wage contract can be written as (3.2.9) with parameters c0, c1,
and c2:
c0 = PC   ee  
2T
  

  
2T
  
2
3T
+
1


;
c1 = e
e
2T
+ 


2T
  2
3T

;
c2 = 
1
3T
 0:
Equation (3.2.10) then follows immediately with V (WT ) =
W 1 T
1  .
Appendix C: Optimal loss aversion contract
Proposition 3 (Optimal LA contract): Under the assumptions that (i) the agent is loss-
averse as described in (4.2.2) and (3.7.1) and (ii) the stock price PT is lognormally distributed as
described in (4.2.1), the optimal contract W (PT ) that solves the shareholdersproblem (4.2.3),
(3.2.4), (4.2.4), (4.2.6), and (4.2.7) is:
W ;LAT =
(
WR + [ ew(PT )] 11  if PT > bP
0 if PT  bP ; (3.10.8)
where ew(PT ) := c0 + c1 lnPT + c2(lnPT )2 and bP is the largest solution to
WR = ew(PT )  WR + (1  ) ( ew(PT )) 11  : (3.10.9)
If no solution for bP exists to (3.10.9), the optimal contract is
W ;LAT =
8<: W
R + [ ew(PT )] 11  if ln(PT ) >   c12c2
WR +

c0   c
2
1
4c2
 1
1 
if ln(PT )    c12c2
: (3.10.10)
The parameters c0, c1, and c2 depend on the distribution of PT and the Lagrange multipliers of
the optimization problem, with c2 > 0.
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Lemma 1 in Appendix A in Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2010) continues to hold. This
lemma states that the optimal contract never pays o¤ in the interior of the loss space. Together
with the assumption that the optimal contract is monotonically increasing, this immediately
implies that either the contract pays out in the gain space only or there exists a cut-o¤ value bP
such that the optimal contract pays out in the gain space for all PT > bP and 0 for all PT < bP .
We can therefore rewrite the optimization problem as:
minbP ;WTWR
Z 1
bP WT g(PT je; )dPT (3.10.11)
s:t:
Z 1
bP V (WT ) g(PT je; )dPT + V (0)G( bP je; )  U + C (e) ; (3.10.12)Z 1
bP V (WT ) ge(PT je; )dPT + V (0)Ge( bP je; )  C 0 (e) ; (3.10.13)Z 1
bP V (WT ) g(PT je; )dPT + V (0)G( bP je; )  0: (3.10.14)
Here, G(PT ) is the cumulative distribution function of the lognormal stock price distribution.
To keep the proof simple, we do not add the monotonicity constraint to the program at this
point. Further below, we check whether the solution to this program satises the monotonicity
constraint.
The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to WT at each point PT  bP is:
@L
@WT
=g(PT je; )  PCV 0 (WT ) g(PT je; )  eV 0 (WT ) ge(PT je; )
  V 0 (WT ) g(PT je; ) (3.10.15)
Setting (3.10.15) to zero and solving gives the optimal contract in the gain space as:
V 0 (WT ) =

PC + e
ge (PT je; )
g (PT je; ) + 
g (PT je; )
g (PT je; )
 1
: (3.10.16)
For the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) preferences (3.7.1) we can rewrite (3.10.16) as:
WT =W
R +



PC + e
ge (PT je; )
g (PT je; ) + 
g (PT je; )
g (PT je; )
 1
1 
: (3.10.17)
87
Substituting the relevant expressions for the lognormal distribution from (3.10.6) and (3.10.7)
and rearranging yields
WT =W
R +

c0 + c1 lnPT + c2(lnPT )
2
 1
1  ; (3.10.18)
where
c0 = PC   ee  
2T
  

  
2T
  
2
3T
+
1


; (3.10.19)
c1 = e
e
2T
+ 


2T
  2
3T

; (3.10.20)
c2 =

3T
 0: (3.10.21)
Equation (3.10.18) provides the shape of the optimal contract for P  bP - provided that it is
monotonic.
The optimal cut-o¤ point bP . To nd bP we take the derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to bP :
@L
@ bP =

 W ( bP ) g( bP je; ) + PC V (W ( bP ))  V (0) g( bP je; )
+ e

V (W ( bP ))  V (0) ge( bP je; ) +  V (W ( bP ))  V (0) g( bP je; ) (3.10.22)
= 

V (W ( bP ))  V (0) g( bP je; )
24 W ( bP )
V (W ( bP ))  V (0)   PC   e
ge
 bP je; 
g
 bP je;    
g
 bP je; 
g
 bP je; 
35 :
(3.10.23)
This derivative of the Lagrangian is zero if the term in squared brackets in (3.10.23) is zero.
Substituting equation (3.10.16) and rearranging yields:
@L
@ bP = 0, V (W ( bP ))  V (0)  V 0

W
 bPW ( bP ) = 0: (3.10.24)
With Tversky and Kahneman (1992) preferences (3.7.1) we obtain:
W ( bP )    WR W ( bP ) WR1    W ( bP ) WR = 0: (3.10.25)
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With (3.10.18) equation (3.10.25) becomes:
WR =

c0 + c1 ln bP + c2(ln bP )2  WR + (1  )c0 + c1 ln bP + c2(ln bP )2 11  : (3.10.26)
This equation denes the threshold bP .
As the wage functionWT from (3.10.18) is quadratic, the solution to condition (3.10.26)
is not unique and might even not exist at all. If no solution exists, the contract always pays o¤
in the gain space, because paying o¤ only in the loss space (i.e. always the minimum wealth
0) violates the participation constraint. With the same argument as the one put forth in the
proof of Proposition 1, the optimal contract is then given by (3.10.18) as long as this function
is monotone increasing. Otherwise, the optimal contract is constant. This proves (3.10.10).
Condition (3.10.26) might have exactly one solution, but this is a non-generic case.
Generically, if there is one solution, there is also a second solution. Then the general LA
contract pays out in the gain space for very low and very high stock prices, while it pays the
minimum wage for an intermediate range. Due to the monotonicity constraint, however, the
contract is forced to pay out the minimum wage for all stock prices below the bigger of the two
solutions to (3.10.26), and this proves (3.10.8). 
Appendix D: Calibration method
This appendix shows how the original optimization problem (4.2.3), (3.2.4), (4.2.6), and (4.2.7)
can be transformed into (3.5.1) to (3.5.4) which can be calibrated to the data. Our derivations
are analogue to those in Dittmann and Maug (2007). We start by rewriting the e¤ort incentive
constraint (4.2.6) so that the LHS of the equation does not contain any quantities that we cannot
compute while the RHS does not contain the wage function (see Jenter (2002)):
PPSua(WT (PT )) = E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dP0

=
C 0(e)
dP0
de
(3.10.27)
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Under the null hypothesis that the model is correct, the observed contract fullls this equation,
so that the e¤ort incentive constraint in our calibration problem can be written as (3.5.3). For
the volatility incentive constraint (4.2.7), equations (3.4.3) and (3.4.7) imply
(WT (PT )) =
dP0
d
1
P0
: (3.10.28)
Note that this equation again separates quantities that we cannot compute (dP0=d) from
quantities that depend on the shape of the optimal contract (). Under our null hypothesis,
we therefore obtain (3.5.4). For the participation constraint (4.2.4), we rst note that it must
be binding as CEO utility is not downward restricted. If the constraint does not bind, we can
shift the wage function downward until it binds. Under the null hypothesis the participation
constraint can then be written as (3.5.2).
Appendix E: Representing the observed contract
Let N be the number of option grants. Each grant i is characterized by the strike price Ki, the
maturity T i, and the number of options niO. We dene
W smthT (PT ) := e
rfT + nSPT e
dT +
NX
i=1
niOV (T
i;Ki; PT )e
rf(T T i); (3.10.29)
where V (T i;Ki; PT ) = E
 
max

PT i  Ki; 0
	 jPT . If T i > T , this is simply the Black-Scholes
value of the option i over the remaining maturity T i   T . If T i < T , we assume that the
option is exercised at time T i if it is in the money and that the proceeds are invested at
the risk-free rate until time T . The proceed at time T i from exercising the option is then
V (T i;Ki; PT ) = E
 
max

PT i  Ki; 0
	 jPT ; P0.
Note that, for each option grant i with T i < T , W smthT (PT ) contains a separate integral
with respect to the stock price at T i conditional on PT . Therefore, D2 is an (m+1)-dimensional
integral, where m is the number of option grants with T i < T . As we cannot solve this numeri-
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cally, we approximate D2 by a sum over 1,001 equally spaced stock prices PT over the range of
stock prices that covers 99.9% of the probability mass.
Appendix F: Users guide on how to calculate risk avoidance 
This Appendix contains formulae for our measure of risk avoidance  from (3.4.7) that can be
readily implemented in a computer program. We start with a few denitions:
PC = P0 exp

rf   d  
2
2

T

;
CV = 
p
T ;
TW = (+W0) exp frfTg ;
MD2 =
ln(K)  ln(PC)
CV
;
With these denitions, we can calculate PPSua and ua as follows:
PPSua =
PC
P0
Z MD2
 1
(TW + nS exp fdTgPC exp fCV ug)  nS exp fdT + CV ug f(u)du
+
Z 1
MD2
(TW + (nS exp fdTg+ nO)PC exp fCV ug   nOK) 
(nS exp fdTg+ nO) exp fCV ug f(u)du]
ua =
Z MD2
 1
(TW + nS exp fdTgPC exp fCV ug)  nS exp fdT + CV ug
PC

 T + u
p
T

f(u)du
+
Z 1
MD2
(TW + (nS exp fdTg+ nO)PC exp fCV ug   nOK)  (nS exp fdTg+ nO)
PC exp fCV ug

 T + u
p
T

f(u)du;
where f(u) is the standard normal density function. Our measure of risk avoidance then follows
from (3.4.7).
For a CEO with more than one option grant, the option portfolio must rst be aggre-
gated into one representative option. We therefore numerically calculate the number of options
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nO, the strike price K, and the maturity T so that the representative option has the same
Black-Scholes value, the same option delta, and the same option vega as the estimated option
portfolio. Hence, we solved the following system of three equations in three variables:
nO BS(P0;K; T; ; rf ) =
X
i
niO BS(P0;Ki; 0:7T i; ; rf )
nO  delta(P0;K; T; ; rf ) =
X
i
niO  delta(P0;Ki; 0:7T i; ; rf )
nO  vega(P0;K; T; ; rf ) =
X
i
niO  vega(P0;Ki; 0:7T i; ; rf );
where niO, K
i, and T i are the number, the strike price, and the maturity of the ith option in
the CEOs option portfolio. We multiply T i by 0.7 to correct for early exercise (see Footnote 11
above).
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Chapter 4
Should Options be Issued in the Money?
Evidence from Model Calibrations with
Risk-Taking Incentives1
This paper investigates the optimal structure of CEO compensation contracts. We consider a
stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between rm risk and mange-
rial incentives. We calibrate the model to individual CEO data and show that the optimal com-
pensation structure looks strikingly di¤erent from observed contracts. Specically we show that
the optimal compensation package should replace at-the-money options and stocks by in-the-
money options. If the tax discrimination against in-the-money options are taken into account,
the model is then consistent with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options.
4.1 Introduction
The paper evaluates the optimal structure for CEO compensation, specically the optimal bal-
ance among base pay, stock, and options. Standard agency theory suggests equity pay  in-
cluding stock and options as one of the mechanisms to reduce agency costs. However, stock
and options are di¤erent in their implications of incentives. While options are cheaper in that
they provide high-power incentives with less cost to shareholders, risk-averse CEOs subjectively
also view them as less valuable.2 Our paper shows that options are indeed part of an optimal
1This chapter is based upon Dittmann and Yu (2008).
2Dittmann and Maug (2007) o¤ers a nice illustration of comparing subjective and objective values of stock
and options in their introduction.
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contract. They can be detrimental to risk-taking incentives, but wreak less havoc than stock.
Having neither stock nor options is not an alternative, because such a contract would not pro-
vide any e¤ort incentives. We also show that the optimal contract consists of xed salary and
in-the-money options barring any tax disadvantages against issuing in-the-money options. After
we factor into the tax disadvantages, the contracts predicted by the model perfectly ts to the
data.
There is an ongoing debate in the literature on whether executive stock options do
provide risk-taking incentives. Intuitively, this seems obvious as the value of an option increases
with the volatility of the underlying asset (see, e.g., Haugen and Senbet (1981) or Smith and
Stulz (1985)). However, Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), and Lewellen (2006) argue that stock
options can make managers more averse to increases in rm risk, so that stock options might be
counter-productive if risk-taking incentives need to be provided.
We approach this question with a new calibration method that incoporates standardized
building blocks from principal-agent theory. We assume that an e¤ort-averse and risk-averse
agent chooses his e¤ort and the rms strategy, and where the strategy a¤ects rm value and
risk. This model incorporates not only the notion that the CEOs actions can a¤ect rm risk
but also rm value. We calibrate this model to the data on 727 U.S. CEOs and for each generate
predictions about the optimal compensation structure, i.e. the optimal mix of base salary, stock,
and options, and the optimal strike price.3
Our calibrations predict contracts with large option holdings and little or no stock.
The optimal strike price is lower than the observed strike price which indicates that options
3There is an ongoing debate in the literature on whether executive stock options do provide risk-taking incen-
tives. Intuitively, this seems obvious as the value of an option increases with the volatility of the underlying asset
(see, e.g., Haugen and Senbet (1981) or Smith and Stulz (1985)). However, Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), and
Lewellen (2006) argue that stock options can make managers more averse to increases in rm risk, so that stock
options might be counter-productive if risk-taking incentives need to be provided. Our paper shows that options
are indeed part of an optimal contract. They can be detrimental to risk-taking incentives, but wreak less havoc
than stock. Having neither stock nor options is not an alternative, because such a contract would not provide
any e¤ort incentives.
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should be issued in the money according to the model. In-the-money options provide incentives
for intermediate and high outcomes and they avoid punishing the CEO for bad outcomes. Hence
they provide e¤ort and risk-taking incentives at the same time. Our model also predicts higher
base salaries than observed, because these must rise as stock is replaced by less valuable options
to guarantee the CEOs reservation utility. The savings that can be expected when rms switch
from the observed contract to the optimal contract are low and average only 5.3% of total
compensation costs.
The U.S. tax system strongly discriminates against in-the-money options.4 In our
calibrations, the savings from recontracting are much smaller than the additional tax penalties
most rms and executives would have to pay if in-the-money options were used. If we include
these tax penalties in our model, observed contracts turn out to be optimal for 76% to 94% of
all CEOs in our sample (depending on assumptions), so our model is broadly consistent with
compensation practice. In this context, our analysis suggests that the current U.S. tax system
forces rms to resort to ine¢ cient contract arrangements, because most rms - and especially
small rms with poor past performance - could benet from granting in-the-money options.
Moreover, our analysis shows that the universal use of at-the-money options, that is often seen
as evidence for managerial rent-extraction (see Bebchuk and Fried (2004)), is perfectly consistent
with e¢ cient contracting.
In our model, CEOs are poorly diversied because a large part of their wealth is linked
to the companys share price to provide e¤ort incentives. In the absence of proper risk-taking
incentives, CEOs therefore prefer low rm risk and tend to choose a rm strategy that results
in ine¢ ciently low risk. They might, for instance, pass up a protable but very risky project,
4According to IRC Section 162(m), in-the-money stock options are not considered as performance-based com-
pensation, so that the "one-million-dollar" rule applies and only up to $1m (including base salary) are deductible
on corporate tax returns. Moreover, Section 409A requires that the di¤erence between the stock price and the
strike price be recognized as income at the time of vesting, rather than on exercise. Thus this rule accelerates
income recognition from the exercise date to the vesting date. In addition, Section 409A imposes an additional
20% tax on this income (see Alexander, Hirschey, and Scholz (2007)).
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or they might hedge their rms risk at some cost. Shareholders can reduce this ine¢ ciency
by providing risk-taking incentives. The challenge is to provide risk-taking incentives without
impairing e¤ort incentives. While high stock price realizations are an unmistakably good signal,
low stock price realizations are ambiguous: they can be indicative of low e¤ort (which is bad)
or of extensive risk-taking (which is good, given that the CEO leans towards ine¢ ciently low
risk). The best way to provide e¤ort and risk-taking incentives together therefore is to reward
good outcomes and not to punish bad ones, i.e. the optimal contract resembles a call option on
the rms stock.
We also contribute to the discussion on whether executive stock options do provide risk-
taking incentives. Intuitively, this seems obvious as the value of an option increases with the
volatility of the underlying asset (see, e.g., Haugen and Senbet (1981) or Smith and Stulz (1985)).
However, Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), and Lewellen (2006) argue that stock options can make
managers more averse to increases in rm risk, so that stock options might be counter-productive
if risk-taking incentives need to be provided. Our paper shows that options are indeed part of an
optimal contract. They can be detrimental to risk-taking incentives, but wreak less havoc than
stock. Having neither stock nor options is not an alternative, because such a contract would
not provide any e¤ort incentives. While we attribute the existence of options to the provision
of risk-taking incentives in this paper, we acknowledge that there are alternative explanations
for the use of options in executive compensation.5
In the next section, we present our model in which the manager must choose e¤ort
5Oyer (2004) models options as a device to retain employees when recontracting is expensive, and Inderst and
Müller (2005) explain options as instruments that provide outside shareholders with better liquidation incentives.
Edmans and Gabaix (2009) and Edmans et al. (2009) show that convex contracts can arise in dynamic contracting
models. Peng and Röell (2009) analyze stock price manipulations in a model with multiplicative CEO preferences
and nd convex contracts for some parameterizations. Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia (1999) assume gamma
distributed stock prices and nd convex contracts, but Dittmann and Maug (2007) show that these results are
not robust. Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2010) show that options can be explained if managers are loss-averse.
With the exception of Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2010), none of these models has been calibrated to data, and
some models are too stylized to be calibrated at all.
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and the rms strategy. We explain our calibration approach and describe our data construction
approach in Section 2 In a nutshell, we numerically search for the cheapest contract with a
given shape that provides the manager with the same incentives and the same utility as the
observed contract. In Section 3, we present our main results on optimal piecewise linear contracts
consisting of base salary, stock, and an option grant. Section 4 discusses reasons why in-the-
money options are rarely used in practice. In particular, we analyze the impact of U.S. taxes on
our calibration results here. Section 5 contains robustness checks, and Section 6 concludes.
4.2 The model and its calibration
4.2.1 Model
We consider two points in time. At time t = 0 the contract between a risk-neutral principal (the
shareholders) and a risk-averse agent (CEO) is signed, and at time t = T the contract period
ends. The market value of the rm at time t = 0 (after the contract details have been disclosed)
is P0 = E(PT ) expf rfTg, where rf is the appropriate rate of return. At some point during
the contract period (0; T ), the agent makes two choices. First, he chooses e¤ort e 2 [0;1)
that results in private costs C(e) to the agent and that a¤ects the rms expected value E(PT ).
Second, he chooses a strategy s that a¤ects the rms expected value E(PT ) and the rms stock
return volatility . We will refer to  interchangeably as rm risk. We can therefore write
E(PT ) = P0(e; s) expfrfTg and  = (s).6
We think of the strategy s as a feasible combination of many di¤erent actions that a¤ect,
among other things, project choice, mergers and acquisitions, capital structure, or nancial
transactions. Part of the strategy could be, for instance, an R&D project that increases value and
risk. Another part could be nancial hedging of some input factor which would reduce value and
6In our model, e¤ort only a¤ects expected value but not rm risk whereas strategy a¤ects both value and risk.
Other models (e.g. Feltham and Wu, 2001) assume that the agent only chooses e¤ort and that e¤ort a¤ects value
and risk. The main di¤erence between Feltham and Wu (2001) and our model in this respect is that our model
allows the CEO to a¤ect value and risk independently of each other.
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risk, etc. Due to its richness, we do not model the agents choice of strategy in detail. Instead we
recognize that a risk-averse agent with a wage contract w(PT ) that is increasing in PT will always
choose an action that minimizes rm risk  given expected value E(PT ), or equivalently that
maximizes expected value E(PT ) given risk . Let es(e; ) denote the strategy that maximizes
expected value E(PT ) given e¤ort e and volatility . Then the agents choice of e¤ort e and
strategy s is equivalent to a choice of e¤ort e and volatility : E(PT ) = P0(e; es(e; )) expfrfTg =
P0(e; ) expfrfTg: In the remainder of this paper, we therefore work with the reduced form of
our model where the agent chooses e¤ort e and volatility .
We assume that there is a rst-best rm strategy s(e) that maximizes rm value (given
e¤ort e). Let (e) := (s(e)) denote the rm risk that is associated with this strategy. If the
agent wants to reduce risk to some value below (e), he can do so in two ways. Either he drops
some risky but protable projects (e.g. an R&D project), or he takes an additional action that
reduces risk but also prots (e.g. costly hedging). In both cases, a reduction in volatility  leads
to a reduction in rm value E(PT ). We therefore assume that P0(e; ) is increasing and concave
in  as long as  < (e). In the region above (e), rm value P0(e; ) is weakly decreasing:
if the agent can costlessly take on more risk in nancial markets, it is at; otherwise, a higher
value of  also leads to a distortion of the agents actions and thereby to a lower rm value.
Finally, we assume that the stock price P0(e; ) is increasing and concave in e (given volatility
).
Our model is in the spirit of Holmström (1979): The principal cannot observe the
agents actions e and , so the managers wage WT only depends on the end-or-period stock
price PT .7 We use risk-neutral pricing and assume that the end-of-period stock price PT is
7The ex-post volatility can obviously be estimated from stock returns, but these are only realizations of the
ex-ante distribution whose volatility the CEO selects. Moreover, volatility is not exclusively determined by the
CEOs management strategy. If the CEO has other means to drive up volatility (e.g. by frequent contradictory
announcements), total observed volatility can be manipulated and can be higher than the fundamental volatility
the CEO selects in our model.
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lognormally distributed:
PT (u; e; ) = P0 (e; ) exp

rf   
2
2

T + u
p
T

; u  N (0; 1) : (4.2.1)
Here, rf is the risk-free rate, and P0(e; ) = E(PT (u; e; )) expf rfTg is the expected present
value of the end-of-period stock price PT .8
The managers utility is additively separable in wealth and e¤ort and has constant
relative risk aversion with parameter  with respect to wealth:
U (WT ; e) = V (WT )  C (e) = W
1 
T
1     C (e) : (4.2.2)
If  = 1, we dene V (WT ) = ln(WT ). Costs of e¤ort are assumed to be increasing and convex in
e¤ort, i.e. C 0(e) > 0 and C 00(e) > 0. There is no direct cost associated with the managers choice
of volatility. Volatility  a¤ects the managers utility indirectly via the stock price distribution
and the utility function V (:). Finally, we assume that the manager has outside employment
opportunities that give him expected utility U . The shareholdersoptimization problem then is:
max
WT ;e;
E [PT  WT (PT )je; ] (4.2.3)
subject to E [V (WT (PT ))je; ]  C(e)  U (4.2.4)
and fe; g 2 argmax fE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]  C(e)g (4.2.5)
We replace the incentive compatibility constraint (4.2.5) with its rst-order conditions:
dE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]
de
  dC
de
= 0 (4.2.6)
dE [V (WT (PT ))je; ]
d
= 0; (4.2.7)
We call condition (4.2.6) the e¤ort incentive constraint and (4.2.7) the volatility incentive con-
straint.
8Risk-neutral pricing allows us to abstract from the agents portfolio problem, because in our model the only
alternative to an investment in the own rm is an investment at the risk-free rate. If we allowed the agent to earn
a risk-premium on the shares of his rm, he could value these above their actual market price, because investing
into his own rm is then the only way to earn the risk-premium. Our assumption e¤ectively means that all risk
in the model is rm-specic.
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4.2.2 Calibration method
We cannot calibrate the full optimization problem to the data, because this requires knowledge
(or estimates) of the production function P0(e; ) and of the cost function C(e). We therefore
resort to the subproblem of nding a new contract with a given shape that achieves three
objectives. Firstly it provides the same e¤ort and risk-taking incentives to the agent as the
observed contract. Secondly it provides the agent with the same utility as the observed contract,
and thirdly it is as cheap as possible for the rm. This subproblem is the rst stage of the two-
stage procedure in Grossman and Hart (1983), where they search for the cheapest contract that
implements a given level of e¤ort. In our case, this is the level of e¤ort that is implemented by
the observed contract. If our model is correct and descriptive of the data, the cheapest contract
found in this optimization will be identical to the observed contract. If the new contract di¤ers
substantially, the observed contract is not e¢ cient according to the model: it is possible to
nd a cheaper contract that implements the same e¤ort and the same investment choices as
the observed contract. In this case, either compensation practice is ine¢ cient or the model is
incorrect. In both cases, the model is not descriptive of the data.
We only calculate the cost-e¤ective contract for the e¤ort/volatility level implemented
by the observed contract. We cannot repeat this task for alternative e¤ort/volatility levels,
because this would require knowledge of the production and the cost function. Therefore we
cannot analyze the optimal level of e¤ort or volatility (i.e., the second stage in Grossman and
Hart (1983)). Our method analyzes the optimal structure of compensation only.
We start by rewriting the e¤ort incentive constraint (4.2.6) so that the LHS of the
equation does not contain any quantities that we cannot compute while the RHS does not
contain the wage function (see Jenter (2002)):
PPSua(WT (PT ); e; ; ) = E

dV (WT )
dWT
dWT
dP0
 e;  = C 0(e)dP0
de
(4.2.8)
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Under the null hypothesis that the model is correct, the observed contract fullls this equation,
so that the e¤ort incentive constraint in our calibration problem becomes:
PPSua(W T (PT ); e; ; ) = PPS
ua(W dT (PT ); e; ; ) (4.2.9)
Here W T denotes the new (cost minimizing) contract and W
d
T denotes the observed contract (d
for "data").
We can reformulate the participation constraint (4.2.4) and the volatility incentive
constraint (4.2.7) in a similar way:
E [V (W T (PT ))je; ; ]  E
h
V (W dT (PT ))je; ; 
i
; (4.2.10)
RTI(W T (PT ); e; ; ) = RTI(W
d
T (PT ); e; ; ): (4.2.11)
For our calibration approach to work, we also need to restrict the shape of the optimal
contract, so that it depends on only a few parameters. In Section ??, we derive the optimal
contract shape which depends on three parameters and we calibrate this to the data. In the
next section, we calibrate a piecewise linear contract that consists of xed salary , the number
of shares nS , and the number of options nO with strike price K:
W linT (PT ) = (W0 + ) expfrfTg+ nSPT + nOmaxfPT  K; 0g: (4.2.12)
With W0 we denote the managers initial non-rm wealth, i.e. all wealth that is not invested
in stock or options of his own rm. We express the number of shares nS and the number
of options nO as a percentage of outstanding shares, so that 0  nS  1. Our numerical
optimization problem is to minimize the costs of the new contract, E
 
W linT (PT )jed; d

, subject
to the constraints (4.2.9), (4.2.10), and (4.2.11). We have four parameters to minimize costs
over: , nS , nO, and K.
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4.2.3 Construction of Data
We use the ExecuComp database to construct approximate CEO contracts at the beginning of
the 2006 scal year. We rst identify all persons in the database who were CEO during the full
year 2006 and executive of the same company in 2005. We calculate the base salary  (which
is the sum of salary, bonus, and "other compensation" from ExecuComp) from 2006 data, and
take information on stock and option holdings from the end of the 2005 scal year. We subsume
bonus payments under base salary, because previous research has shown that bonus payments
are only weakly related to rm performance (see Hall and Liebman (1998)).9
We estimate each CEOs option portfolio with the method proposed by Core and Guay
(2002) and then aggregate this portfolio into one representative option. This aggregation is
necessary to arrive at a parsimonious wage function (in fact at (4.2.12)) that can be calibrated
to the data. Our model is static and therefore cannot accommodate option grants with di¤erent
maturities. The representative option is determined so that it has a similar e¤ect as the actual
option portfolio on the agents utility, his e¤ort incentives, and his risk-taking incentives. More
precisely, we numerically calculate the number of options nO, the strike priceK, and the maturity
T so that the representative option has the same Black-Scholes value, the same option delta,
and the same option vega as the estimated option portfolio.10 In this step, we lose ve CEOs
for whom we cannot numerically solve this system of three equations in three unknowns.
We take the rms market capitalization P0 from the end of 2005. While our formulae
above abstract from dividend payments for the sake of simplicity, we take dividends into account
9We do not take into account pension benets, because they are di¢ cult to compile and because there is no role
for pensions in a one-period model. Pensions can be regarded as negative risk-taking incentives (see Sundaram
and Yermack (2007)), so that we overestimate risk-taking incentives in observed contracts.
10We take into account the fact that most CEOs exercise their stock options before maturity by multiplying the
maturities of the individual option grants by 0.7 before calculating the representative option (see Huddart and
Lang (1996) and Carpenter (1998)). In these calculations, we use the stock return volatility from ExecuComp
and, for the risk-free rate, the U.S. government bond yield with 5-year maturity from January 2006. Data on
risk-free rates have been obtained from the Federal Reserve Boards website. For CEOs who do not have any
options, we set K = P0 and T = 10 as these are typical values for newly granted options.
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in our empirical work and use the dividend rate d from 2005. We estimate the rms stock return
volatility  from daily CRSP stock returns over the scal year 2006 and drop all rms with fewer
than 220 daily stock returns on CRSP. We use the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database to link
ExecuComp with CRSP data. The risk-free rate is set to the U.S. government bond yield with
ve-year maturity from January 2006.
We estimate the non-rm wealth W0 of each CEO from the ExecuComp database by
assuming that all historic cash inows from salary and the sale of shares minus the costs of
exercising options have been accumulated and invested year after year at the one-year risk-free
rate. We assume that the CEO had zero wealth when he entered the database (which biases
our estimate downward) and that he did not consume since then (which biases our estimate
upward). To arrive at meaningful wealth estimates, we discard all CEOs who do not have a
history of at least ve years (from 2001 to 2005) on ExecuComp. During this period, they need
not be CEO. This procedure results in a data set with 737 CEOs.
Table 1 Panel A provides an overview of our data set. The median CEO owns 0.3%
of the stock of his company and has options on an additional 1% of the companys stock. The
median base salary is $1.1m, and the median non-rm wealth is $11.1m. The representative
option has a median maturity of ve years and is well in the money with a moneyness (K=P0)
of 72%. Most stock options are granted at the money in the United States (see Murphy (1999)),
but after a few years they are likely to be in the money. This is the reason why the representative
option grant is in the money for 90% of the CEOs in our sample. In the interest of readability,
we call an option with a strike price K that is close to the observed strike price Kd an "at-the-
money option". Consequently, we call an option grant "in-the-money" only if its strike price K
is lower than the observed strike price Kd.
We require that all CEOs in our data set are included in the ExecuComp database for
103
the years 2001 to 2006, and this requirement is likely to bias our data set towards surviving
CEOs, namely those who are older and richer and who work in bigger and more successful rms.
Table 1 Panel B describes the full ExecuComp universe of CEOs in 2006. Compared to this larger
sample, our CEOs are, on average, one year older and own somewhat more options (+0:1%).
They work in bigger rms (+$500m) with better past performance (1:25% higher return during
the past ve years). We conclude that our sample is subject to a moderate survivorship bias. We
investigate this bias by separately analyzing subsamples with more successful and less successful
CEOs in Section 4.5.
The only parameter in our model that we cannot estimate from the data is the man-
agers coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion . We therefore repeat our analysis for six di¤erent
risk-aversion parameters ranging from  = 0:5 (low risk-aversion) to  = 8 (strong risk-aversion).
This range includes the risk-aversion parameters used in previous research. We regard values
of  below 1 as unrealistically low as they imply implausible private portfolio decisions: with
 < 1, the CEO would like to borrow heavily and invest much more than his entire wealth in
the stock market.
4.3 Optimal Compensation Structure
In this section we present our main empirical results. For each CEO in our sample, we nu-
merically calculate the cheapest piecewise linear contract that provides the manager with the
same utility and the same incentives as the observed contract. We call this cheaper contract the
"optimal contract" and compare it with the observed contract.
More formally, we minimize E
 
W linT (PT )

subject to the participation constraint (4.2.10)
and the two incentive compatibility constraints (4.2.9) and (4.2.11). We need a few additional
restrictions, so that the problem is well-dened. First, we assume that the number of shares nS
is non-negative. We allow for negative option holdings nO and negative salaries , but we require
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that nO >  nS expfdTg and  >  W0 to prevent negative payouts. Negative option holdings
or negative salaries are rarely seen in practice, but they are certainly possible. A negative salary
would imply that the rm requires the CEO to invest this amount of his private wealth in rm
equity. We argue that a good model should not assume but rather generate positive option
holdings and positive salaries.11
We also need to restrict the strike price K, because options and shares become indis-
tinguishable if K approaches zero, and the problem becomes poorly identied if K is small. We
work with two lower bounds for K. We rst solve the numerical problem with the restriction
K=P0  20%. If we nd a corner solution with K=P0 = 20%, we repeat the calibration with
a lower bound K=P0  10%. If the second calibration does not converge, we use the (corner)
solution from the rst step.12
Table 2, Panel A contains our calibration results for six values of the risk-aversion
parameter , ranging from 0.5 to 8. For low values of risk-aversion we lose some of our 737
observations, because risk-taking incentives from (3.4.7) are positive.13 The column Observa-
tions displays the remaining observations after CEOs with positive ua have been deleted, and
the column Converged shows the number of CEOs for which our numerical routine was suc-
cessful. In addition, the table describes the four contract parameters , nS , nO, and K of the
calibrated optimal contract, and the percentage savings the rm could realize by switching from
11We do not allow for negative stockholdings, because compensation could then become non-monotonic in stock
price.
12In many cases, the objective function in our problem is rather at around the optimal solution. In order to
check whether an interior solution with nS > 0 is indeed the optimal solution (in most cases we nd n

S = 0, as we
discuss shortly), we repeat our calibration with the additional restriction nS = 0 whenever we obtain a solution
with nS > 0 in the original problem. In almost all cases, the contract with nS = 0 is slightly cheaper than the
initially found contract with nS > 0. This shows that interior solutions with n

S > 0 are a numerical artifact. For
our empirical analysis we always use the solution with the lowest costs.
13As long as the agent is risk-averse, our model predicts negative RTI in equilibrium (see the discussion at the
end of Section 2.2). Therefore, a positive RTI directly rejects our model assumptions. We interpret the fact that
RTI > 0 for many CEOs for   1 as a conrmation that these levels of risk-aversion are unrealistically low.
Note that, for the more reasonable value  = 3, virtually all the CEOs in our sample have negative RTI.
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the observed contract W dT to the optimal contract W

T , i.e.
savings =
h
E

W dT (PT )

  E (W T (PT ))
i
=E

W dT (PT )

: (4.3.1)
Optimal contracts di¤er systematically from observed contracts regarding the CEOs
stock holdings. While observed contracts nearly always contain stock holdings, 99% of all CEOs
would not receive any shares according to the optimal contract for  = 3. Instead, the strike
price of their option holdings would be much lower: the median strike price is 51% of the share
price compared to 72% for the observed contract. While average and median option holdings
are higher for the optimal contract with  = 3, this is not uniformly so for all CEOs. Instead,
we nd that the sum of stock and options is always smaller in the optimal contract than in the
observed contract (not shown in the table). Therefore, the optimal contract is less steep than
the observed contract in the best states of the world.
The general picture is that the stock and option holdings in the observed contract
are replaced by option holdings that are considerably deeper in the money. As options are less
valuable than shares, this exchange is accompanied by an increase in base salary, so that the new
contract provides the same expected utility to the agent as the observed contract. The model
predicts that median base salaries (for  = 3) should nearly triple from $1.1m to $3.2m. For
  1, optimal base salaries and option holdings are virtually always positive. Hence, a model
with e¤ort and risk-taking incentives can explain these stylized facts far better than models that
account for e¤ort incentives only. In those models, at least 25% of the CEOs should receive no
options or a negative xed salary (see Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Dittmann, Maug and
Spalt (2010)).
Figure 4.3.1 illustrates our main results. It shows the payout function WT (PT ) of
the observed contract and the optimal contract for one CEO in our sample. This CEO is
not representative for our sample; for a typical CEO the two contracts are more di¢ cult to
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Figure 4.3.1: The gure shows end-of-period wealth WT as a function of end-of-period stock
price PT for the observed contract (solid line) and the optimal piecewise linear contract (dashed
line) for one CEO in our sample. The arrows indicate the three main features of the optimal
contract relative to the observed contract: (1) it punishes very bad outcomes less, (2) it rewards
very good outcomes less, and (3) the strike price of the option grant is lower. The parameters for
this CEO are  = $6:3m, nS = 5:97%, nO = 4:44% for the observed contract. Initial non-rm
wealth is W0 = $32:1m. P0 = $853m,  = 25:7%, and K=P0 = 90%, T = 4:4 years, rf = 4:4%,
d = 0:9%, and  = 3.
distinguish visually. The three arrows in Figure 1 indicate the main features of the optimal
contract and help to develop an intuition for our main result that in-the-money options are
a cheaper way to provide incentives than a portfolio of stock and at-the-money options. The
rst feature of the optimal contract is that it provides for less punishment in the bad states
of the world than the observed contract, which improves risk-taking incentives. On the other
hand, the optimal contract also gives fewer rewards in the best states of the world (feature 2),
which reduces risk-taking incentives. These two e¤ects o¤set each other, so that the optimal
contract provides the same risk-taking incentives as the observed contract. E¤ort incentives, on
the other hand, are reduced by both features (1) and (2). Moving the strike price more into the
money (feature 3), however, increases e¤ort incentives and o¤sets the e¤ect of features (1) and
(2). Therefore, the optimal contract also generates the same e¤ort incentives as the observed
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contract; it merely moves some of the e¤ort incentives from the tails of the distribution to its
center. Finally observe that features (1) and (2) make the optimal contract less risky than the
observed contract. Therefore the agent demands a lower risk-premium for the optimal contract
than for the observed contract, and the optimal contract is cheaper for shareholders.
However, the savings generated by switching to the optimal contract are limited. For
 = 3, the median rm would just save 2:6% of its compensation costs (the average is 5:3%, see
Table 2, Panel A). The savings in the case shown in Figure 1 are 2:8%. This is hardly a savings
potential that would trigger shareholder activism or takeovers. The comparatively small savings
imply that a portfolio of stock and at-the-money options is a good substitute for in-the-money
options. The numerical ip side of low savings is that the objective function (after taking into
account the constraints) is rather at. While this is certainly a complication when it comes to
solving the model numerically (see Footnote 12), it is not a problem of our model but rather a
result.
While 98:8% of the CEOs in our sample would not receive any stock if rms imple-
mented the optimal contract, there are still 1:2% who would. A more detailed analysis (not
shown in the tables) shows that there are two reasons for these positive stockholdings. A few
CEOs have no options in their observed contract, so that it is not possible to construct an
alternative contract with all the three features highlighted in Figure 1. For other CEOs, our
optimization routine hits the boundary K=P0 = 20% or K=P0 = 10% , so that we have a corner
solution with positive stock holdings. Beyond these two cases, we nd no true interior solutions
with nS > 0, except for  = 0:5. We therefore conclude that, within our model, in-the-money
options are generally preferable to a portfolio of at-the-money options and stock.
Table 2, Panel B reproduces the results from Panel A for those 282 CEOs for which our
algorithm converges for all   1. This table shows that, as  increases, the optimal contract
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features fewer stock options, lower strike prices, and lower base salaries. Therefore, the contract
becomes atter and less convex as  increases. Savings are considerable for high levels of risk-
aversion and negligible for  = 1. This nding is not surprising as savings stem from improved
risk-sharing, which is more important if CEOs are more risk-averse.
4.4 Taxes and the popularity of at-the-money options
The low savings from recontracting shown in Table 2 imply that observed compensation practice
is consistent with our model if there is an e¤ect (possibly even small) in favor of shareholdings
or at-the-money options that we did not account for in our model. In this section, we review a
few potential reasons why at-the-money options are so popular in compensation practice.
The U.S. tax system strongly discriminates against in-the-money options (see Footnote
4). According to IRC Section 409A, income from in-the-money options is subject to a 20%
penalty tax that has to be paid by the executive at the time of vesting. Shares, at-the-money
options, or out-of-the-money options are not subject to this additional tax. Walker (2009) argues
that this rule "is probably the measure that most strongly discourages explicit grants of in-the-
money options." Moreover, in-the-money options (like restricted stock) do not automatically
qualify as performance based pay under IRC Section 162(m) and therefore count towards the
$1 million per executive that are tax deductible at rm level. However, this rule can be easily
circumvented by subjecting in-the-money options to specic performance criteria. We therefore
concentrate on the 20% penalty tax from Section 409A and neglect the potential e¤ects of Section
162(m) in the following analysis.14
To illustrate the e¤ect of taxes, we rst consider a representative CEO whose para-
14Another potential reason why we do not see in-the-money options in the U.S. are the U.S. accounting rules.
In-the-money options always had to be expensed while at-the-money options did not need to be expensed prior
to 2006. These accounting reasons probably explain the absence of in-the-money options before 2004, the year in
which Section 409A was enacted.
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meters are closest to the median values shown in Table 1.15 The observed contract of this
representative CEO consists of $1.1m base salary, $7.9m stock, and at-the-money options with
a Black-Scholes value of $12.1m. Our model proposes instead $3.9m base salary, no stock, and
in-the-money options with a value of $17.0m. This contract would generate savings of $0.2m
or 1% of total compensation costs, but the CEO would have to pay additional taxes of $3.4m
(= 20%  $17m) in expectation, so that a portfolio of stock and at-the-money options is cheaper
than in-the-money options if taxes are taken into account.
In order to investigate this tax e¤ect more systematically, we repeat our numerical
analysis for  = 3 with the 20% tax penalty on in-the-money options. We assume that this
tax must be paid if and only if the strike price is lower than the observed strike price, so we
e¤ectively assume that all options in the observed contract have been issued at-the-money. We
nd that in this setting the observed contract turns out to be optimal for 93:7% of all CEOs for
whom our algorithm converges (not shown in the tables).
This tax analysis does not take into account that part of the shares held by an executive
might not be restricted but held voluntarily. If these are replaced by in-the-money options, the
executive would have to sell them and buy in-the-money options from the proceeds. As these
options are bought from private wealth, they would not be subject to the 20% penalty tax.16
In the above example, all the shares held by the representative CEO are unrestricted. If he
sells them and invests the proceeds of $7:9m into options, only $9:1m (= $17m  $7:9m) are
subject to the penalty tax, resulting in a penalty of $1:82m which still exceeds the benets from
recontracting ($0:2m). For the full sample, we nd that the optimal contract remains optimal
15For each parameter (observed salary d, observed stock holdings ndS , observed option holdings n
d
O, wealth
W0, rm size P0, stock return volatility , time to maturity T , and moneyness K=P0) and each CEO we calculate
the absolute percentage di¤erence between individual and median value. Then we calculate the maximum relative
di¤erence for each CEO and select the CEO for whom this maximum di¤erence is smallest.
16It is not obvious that this second way to include taxes in our model is necessarily the more accurate one.
Unrestricted shares can also be seen as the result of restricted stock awarded in previous periods. If in-the-money
options instead of restricted stock had been issued in the previous periods, the tax penalty would have applied.
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for 75:5% of all CEOs under these assumptions. For the remaining 24:5% the optimal contract
is identical to the optimal contract without taxes (see Table 2), except that more options are
awarded to compensate the CEO for the tax payment.
Many other countries (including the U.K., Canada, Germany, and France) discourage
the use of in-the-money options, so the United States is not an exception (see Walker, 2009).17
A potential reason is that the rest of the world generally tends to follow the U.S. when it comes
to executive compensation and especially executive stock options. Alternatively, one can argue
that in-the-money options cause some costs that are not included in our model and that justify
government intervention. Our results in Table 2 show that the use of in-the-money options is
associated with large increases in base salary. These might be di¢ cult to explain to shareholders
and the general public, and might cause social unrest and higher wage demands. Alternatively,
there might be concerns that executives try to inuence the strike price of the option grants just
as some appear to have done in the recent backdating scandal. A commitment to using only
at-the-money options could reduce this rent-seeking activity, and our analysis shows that the
costs of such a commitment are low.
4.5 Robustness Checks
Sample selection bias Our data set is subject to a moderate survivorship bias, as we require
that CEOs are covered by the ExecuComp database for at least ve years. Table 1 demonstrates
that younger and less successful CEOs are underrepresented in our data set. We therefore divide
our sample in quintiles according to four variables: CEOsnon-rm wealth W0, CEO age, rm
value P0, and the past ve yearsstock return. Table 3 displays for these subsamples the average
savings as a percentage of pay that rms could realize by switching to the optimal piecewise
linear contract. The last line shows the p-value of the Wilcoxon test that average savings are
17Australia is the only country for which we could nd evidence that in-the-money options are commonly used.
See Rosser and Canil (2004).
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identical in the rst and the fth quintile.
The table shows that savings are considerably higher for younger and especially less
wealthy CEOs. With constant relative risk-aversion, higher wealth implies lower absolute risk-
aversion and consequently fewer gains from e¢ cient risk-sharing. The table also demonstrates
that smaller rms and those with poor past performance would benet more from recontracting.
Their CEOs typically have options that are less in-the-money or even out-of-the-money. There-
fore, the payout pattern of their options di¤ers more from that of their stock holdings than it
does for more successful CEOs. In our model, savings are generated by replacing the portfolio
of stock and options with an option grant that is "intermediate" in the sense that its strike price
lies between the strike price of the original option and zero, which is the "strike price" of stock.
The scope for these savings is larger, if stock and options in the observed contract di¤er more
from one another, i.e. if the strike price of the original option is high. This suggests that our
full sample results are biased downwards and that the average savings in the unbiased sample
would be somewhat higher than the 5:3% shown in Table 2.
Wealth robustness check CEO wealth is not observable and we can therefore work only
with a rough approximation. In order to see to what extent our results depend on our wealth
estimates, we repeat our analysis after multiplying the wealth estimate of all CEOs by a factor
M that ranges from 0:5 to 2. Table 4 displays the results for  = 3.
A comparison of Table 2, Panel A and Table 4 shows that an increase in wealth W0
has a similar e¤ect as a decrease in the risk aversion parameter . With constant relative risk-
aversion, higher wealth implies lower absolute risk-aversion. This leads to more options, a higher
strike price, and lower savings. In absolute terms, however, the variation of our results across
di¤erent wealth multipliersM is small. We therefore conclude that the imprecision in our wealth
estimates is unlikely to bias our results signicantly. Our qualitative results are certainly not
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a¤ected.
CEO preferences The CEOs attitude to risk is central to our model. So far we have assumed
that the CEOs preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). In order to see
whether our results are robust to alternative assumptions on CEO risk aversion, we repeat
our analysis from Table 2 with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), so that V CARA (WT ) =
  exp ( WT ) replaces V (WT ) in equation (4.2.2). To maintain comparability with our previous
results, we calculate the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion  from  so that both utility functions
exhibit the same risk-aversion at the expected end-of-period wealth, i.e. we set  = =(W0+0),
where 0 is the market value of the managers contract (i.e., the costs of the contract to the
rm). Table 5 displays the results for six di¤erent values of .
The results are quite similar to those for CRRA in Table 2, Panel A. With CARA
preferences, the strike price is somewhat higher than with CRRA preferences: for  = 3 the
strike price averages 52:1% for CARA instead of 50:5% for CRRA. Savings from recontracting
are higher for CARA than for CRRA for low values of risk-aversion ( < 3) while the opposite
holds for high values of risk-aversion ( > 3). We conclude that our results continue to hold for
CARA utility.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the optimal stock/option mix using a principal-agent model. We nd
optimal contracts that look very di¤erent from observed compensation practice. According to
the model, managers should not receive any stock but instead in-the-money options and higher
xed salary. However, the savings generated by switching to this optimal contract are low and
average only 5:3%. This suggests that observed compensation practice is close to the optimum
and that a slight preference of shareholders for stock, for at-the-money options, or against an
increase in base salary renders observed compensation practice e¢ cient. One such e¤ect included
in our model in a robustness check is the extra tax that must be paid by the rm and the CEO
if options are issued in the money. These tax penalties are prohibitive for most rms, i.e. they
render the observed contract e¢ cient if they are taken into account. But even in the absence
of such taxes, the observed contract can easily be optimal if rms have a preference not to
increase base salaries and are willing to forgo the 5:3% savings. In times of an increasingly hot
public debate on executive compensation, such an upward restriction on base salaries appears
plausible.18
In the principal-agent model, the agent does not only exert e¤ort but also determines
the rms strategy and thereby its stock return volatility. The choice of a more risky strategy
has two e¤ects on the managers compensation. The rst, obvious e¤ect is that higher volatility
makes future payo¤s more risky, so that the utility a risk-averse manager derives from restricted
stock drops. This e¤ect has already been analyzed extensively in the literature (see Lambert,
Larcker and Verrecchia, 1991; Guay, 1999; Carpenter, 2000; Ross, 2004). The second e¤ect
that has so far been neglected by the empirical literature is that a more risky rm strategy
also increases expected rm value. The reason is that the rst-best solution, where the optimal
18See Hall and Murphy (2000) for an alternative justication of at-the-money strike prices.
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management strategy is chosen irrespective of its risk, is not achievable. In the second-best
solution, the manager passes up some protable but risky projects as these would reduce his
utility, or he adopts some unprotable but safe projects that increase his utility. If the rms
strategy is adjusted and becomes more risky in this second-best environment, more protable
and less unprotable projects will be adopted and rm value increases. Therefore, it is not
su¢ cient to only consider the direct impact of an increase in risk on a managers compensation
package (vega) to determine his attitude towards an increase in risk. The indirect e¤ect via
an increase in rm value and the managers equity incentives (delta) must also be taken into
account. Our paper provides - to the best of our knowledge - the rst empirical analysis of a
full principal agent model that takes both e¤ects into account.
A limitation of our main analysis is its restriction to a single option grant (with a single
strike price). In order to understand optimal contracts with more than one option grant, we
derive and estimate the general monotonic contract that is not restricted to be piecewise linear.
Any piecewise linear contract with a given number of option grants will be an approximation
to this general monotonic contract. We nd that the optimal monotonic contract pays a at
wage for low outcomes and is increasing and eventually concave over medium and high outcomes.
Therefore, it can be implemented by a high xed salary (twice the observed salary for the median
CEO), long option holdings with low, in-the-money strike price, and short option holdings with
higher strike prices. Alternatively, it can be approximated by xed salary and a linear bonus
scheme with an upper bound on the bonus payout (see Healy, 1985). Such a contract would
save up to 12:9% for the average rm.
Another limitation of our analysis is that our model is static and considers only two
points in time: the time of contract negotiation and the time when the nal stock price is realized.
Realistically, a bad or unlucky CEO is likely to be replaced if the stock price drops by more than
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50%.19 Such a dismissal has two consequences. First it might a¤ect rm performance if the new
CEO is more skilled than the ousted CEO. This e¤ect is beyond the scope of our model, as at
least two periods are necessary to describe it. Second, dismissals negatively a¤ect the payout of
the ousted CEO, mainly because it reduces the CEOs future employment opportunities. Our
model predicts a at pay for low levels of stock price, so this negative e¤ect of a dismissal is
undesirable. Consequently, our analysis can also be interpreted as a justication of severance
pay that compensates the manager for his loss in human capital (see Yermack (2006)).
4.7 Tables and Figures
19Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Kaplan (1994), and Jenter and Kanaan (2006), among others, analyze the
sensitivity of dismissals to past stock price performance.
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 Table 1: Description of the dataset 
This table displays mean, median, standard deviation, and the 10% and 90% quantile of the variables in our 
dataset. Stock holdings nS and option holdings nO are expressed as a percentage of all outstanding shares. 
Panel A describes our sample of 737 CEOs from 2006. Panel B describes all 1,490 executives in the 
ExecuComp universe who are CEO in 2006. 
 
Panel A: Data set with 737 U.S. CEOs 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile 
Stock (%) nS 1.76% 4.85% 0.04% 0.31% 3.96% 
Options (%) nO 1.40% 1.62% 0.15% 0.96% 3.19% 
Base Salary ($m)  1.60 4.29 0.50 1.07 2.43 
Non-firm Wealth ($m) W0 64.9 671.5 2.3 11.1 64.1 
Firm Value ($m) P0 9,347 23,296 366 2,418 19,614 
Strike Price ($m) K 6,929 20,209 236 1,556 12,853 
Moneyness (%) K/P0 70.6% 21.1% 42.1% 71.8% 99.9% 
Maturity (years) T 5.2 1.6 3.6 5.0 6.6 
Stock Volatility (%) σ 30.3% 13.6% 16.5% 28.5% 45.8% 
Dividend Rate (%) d 1.37% 3.96% 0.00% 0.66% 3.38% 
CEO Age (years)  55.9 6.8 47 56 64 
Stock Return 2001-5 (%) 11.8% 15.5% -5.7% 11.5% 28.8% 
 
Panel B: All 1,490 ExecuComp CEOs in 2006 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile 
Stock (%) nS 1.95% 6.26% 0.02% 0.28% 4.22% 
Options (%) nO 1.26% 1.57% 0.08% 0.79% 2.88% 
Base Salary ($m)  1.68 4.01 0.48 1.02 2.63 
Firm Value ($m) P0 8,840 24,760 339 2,091 17,796 
CEO Age (years)  55.1 7.1 46 55 64 
Stock Return 2001-5 (%) 10.5% 23.2% -13.8% 9.8% 34.1% 
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 Table 3: Savings from recontracting for subsamples 
This table shows average savings for quintiles formed according to four variables: initial non-firm wealth 
W0, CEO age, firm value P0, and the past five year stock return (from the start of 2001 to the end of 2005). 
The risk-aversion parameter γ is set equal to 3. Savings are the difference in compensation costs between 
observed contract and optimal piecewise linear contract expressed as a percentage of costs of the observed 
contract, (π0
d
 – π0*)/π0
d
. The last row shows the p-value of the two-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test that 
the average savings are identical in Quintile 1 and Quintile 5. 
 
Quin
-tile 
Wealth W0  
(in $m) 
  CEO Age   
Firm Value P0  
(in $m) 
  
Stock return  
2001-2005 
Mean Savings   Mean Savings   Mean Savings   Mean Savings 
1 2.2 10.0%  46.2 7.3%  381 8.7%  -9.1% 9.7% 
2 5.4 5.7%  51.5 5.3%  1,122 5.5%  4.9% 5.0% 
3 10.3 4.6%  55.1 4.5%  2,462 4.3%  11.2% 4.0% 
4 21.5 4.4%  57.9 5.7%  6,406 4.0%  17.2% 3.9% 
5 246.3 2.0%  63.4 4.1%  33,935 4.1%  32.8% 4.0% 
P-Value Q1-Q5 0.0000     0.0001     0.0001     0.0000 
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The dissertation studies both theoretical and empirical components in executive compensation.
The next section will give a short summary of the main ndings of the three chapters followed
by implications and suggestions for future research.
5.1 Summary of the Main Findings
Chapter 2 constructs a novel measure of executive optimism by separating incentives that CEOs
receive and the incentives CEOs can and should get rid of as a risk-averse agent. The opti-
mistic ratio measure is based on executivesrelative portfolio compositions in unrestricted and
restricted parts. We show that CEO optimistic ratios are positively and signcantly related to
rm-specic price crash risk. Optimistic CEOs tend to spend more on R&D projects while pro-
ducing less innovation output in return. The paper provides new evidence that CEO personal
portfolio decisions are related to rm performance. The results are robust to various empirical
specications and various previously identied factors of stock price crash risk.
In Chapter 3, we consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO
with risk-taking incentives in addition to e¤ort incentives. We show that the optimal contract
protects the CEO from losses for bad outcomes, is convex for medium outcomes, and concave
for good outcomes. We calibrate the model to data on 727 CEOs and show that it can explain
observed contracts much better than the standard model without risk-taking incentives. Under
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the assumptions that contracting is e¢ cient and that CEOs are e¤ort-averse and risk-averse,
our results imply that the provision of risk-taking incentives is a major objective in executive
compensation practice. We can reject the hypothesis that risk-taking incentives in observed
contracts are a mere by-product of e¤ort incentives. A new measure of risk-taking (dis)incentives
that measures the required probability an additional risky project must exceed in order to be
adopted by the CEO is proposed. Subsequently in Chapter 4, we apply the same model to
contracts that consist of base salary, stock, and options yields that options should be issued
in the money. If the tax discrimination against in-the-money options are taken into account,
the model is then consistent with the almost uniform use of at-the-money stock options. We
conclude that risk-taking incentives are important in provisions
5.2 Implications and Suggestions for Future Research
The relationship we document between CEO optimism and stock price crash is quite strong
and more robust than regular incentive alignment measures. In particular, we show that the
incentives CEOs should get rid of, not the incentives CEOs receive, play a more signicant role
in stock price crashes. This suggests that closer attention should be paid to managerial portfolio
decisions in addition to managerial portofolio compositions. Traditionally in the literature, the
attention is on how much incentives are contracted to the executives, without taking how much
incentives executives can get rid of into account. While there is another strand of literature
that considers executive option expensing behavior1, there is hardly any paper that considers
both aspects in the dynamics of incentive evolution. Our ndings have important implications
in combining both aspects in executive compensation: the incentives CEOs receive and the
incentives CEOs get rid of.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, a unique calibration approach2 that requires a minimum
1See Klein and Maug (2009) for examples of the literature.
2For detailed implementation methods, one can refer to Dittmann, Maug, Spalt, and Zhang (2011).
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set of parameter assumptions and enables model tting for each CEO in the sample, not simply
the average, is employed. In comparison with regular empirical studies, our calibration approach
circumvents the endogeneity problem by specically modeling the likely simultaneous relation-
ship between corporate risk-taking policies and executive risk-taking incentives. In comparison
with regular theoretical research, the approach incorporates more information in the calibration,
and allows us to test the quantitative (not just the qualitative) implications of di¤erent models.
One of the possible extension to the already complicated model in Chapter 3 and 4 is
to consider the dynamics of incentive revolution as suggested in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, we
show that not only the incentives that CEOs receive, but also the incentives that CEOs should
get rid of play a role in corporate policies. It would be interesting to consider this in a model
that incorporates both aspects in incentives and study the implications on evolution of executive
pay and corporate policies.
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Chapter 6
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
In de afgelopen 20 jaar stonden vergoedingen voor topmanagement centraal in zowel academische
discussies, als in de kranten van Wall Street. Hebben aandeelhouders te veel betaald aan CEOs?
Zijn de vergoedingen nodig voor het werven en behouden van leidinggevend talent? Is de manier
waarop de vergoedingen zijn opgebouwd redelijk? Of bevordert de manier waarop beloond wordt
dat CEOs gaan manipuleren?
Het debat tussen het zogenaamde rent-seekingidee, waarbij leidinggevenden steeds
geld onttrekken van hun aandeelhouders, en het e¢ cient contracting idee, waar de beloning
voor de leidinggevenden wordt bepaald door rationele economische overwegingen van de aandeel-
houders, lijkt op korte termijn geen denitieve conclusie op te leveren. Dit proefschrift draagt bij
aan het debat door in de eerste twee hoofdstukken een economische verklaring te geven voor de
huidige beloningssystemen. Vervolgens zal ik in hoofdstuk vier beschrijven hoe bedrijven, wiens
CEOs meer aandelen en opties hebben dan nodig, een grotere kans hebben op een plotselinge
daling van de beurskoers. Een te groot optimisme van de CEOs kan hiervan de oorzaak zijn.
Hoofdstuk 2 "CEO Optimism en Stock Crashesonderzoekt wat er gebeurt als CEOs
meer bedrijfsaandelen bezitten dan nodig is. De standaard agency-theorie gaat uit van een
belangenconict wat de risicos betreft zoals geïllustreerd in de laatste twee hoofdstukken. Lei-
dinggevenden zijn meer risicomijdend omdat hun rijkdom sterk verbonden is met het bedrijf,
en ze de risicos niet kunnen afdekken zoals algemene aandeelhouders dat kunnen. Waarom
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blijven ze vasthouden aan de aandelen en opties wanneer ze deze eigenlijk niet nodig hebben?
Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt een aantal mogelijke redenen. Ik construeer een manier om dit op-
timisme te kunnen meten gebaseerd op de relatieve mix van beperkte en onbeperkte prikkels
en toon aan dat CEOs met een hogere ratio optimisme - een ratio van onbeperkte stimuli loon
en totale prikkel loon, meer kans hebben om meer uit te geven aan R & D-projecten, maar
minder e¤ectief zijn in innovatieve resultaten. En hun bedrijven hebben meer kans op grote
koersdalingen. De resultaten zijn robuust voor tal van empirische settings en overtre¤en de
bestaande voorspellers van aandelenkoers-crashes.
In hoofdstuk 3, getiteld " How Important are Risk Taking Incentive in Executive Com-
pensation?" onderzoeken we een model waarin aandeelhouders een risico mijdende CEO extra
beloningen geven die aanzetten om risicos te nemen, in aanvulling op de normale belondingen.
We laten zien dat een optimale contract de CEO beschermt tegen verliezen vanwege slechte re-
sultaten, convex is voor gemiddelde resultaten, en concaaf voor goede resultaten. We kalibreren
het model met gegevens over 727 CEOs en laten zien dat het de beoordeelde contracten beter
verklaart dan het standaard model zonder prikkels die aanzetten tot het nemen van risicos. Uit
het toepassen hiervan op contracten die bestaan uit een basissalaris, aandelen en opties blijkt
dat opties als geld uitgekeerd moeten worden. Bovendien stellen wij voor een nieuwe maatregel
te nemen rondom (anti) prikkels die de benodigde kansmeet, die een extra risicovol project
moet overschrijden om te kunnen worden uitgevoerd door de CEO.
Hoofdstuk 4 " Should Options be Issued in the Money? Evidence from Model Calibra-
tions with Risk-Taking Incentives onderzoekt de optimale structuur van CEO-vergoedingen,
met name veelgebruikte compensatiemechanismen zoals: een vast salaris, aandelen en opties.
We passen hetzelfde model toe uit hoofdstuk 2 op de individuele CEO gegevens en laten zien dat
het optimale compensatie pakket at-the-money opties en aandelen vervangen door in-the-money
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opties. Het blijkt dat het model de praktijk van vergoedingen verrassend goed kan verklaren.
Als men rekening houdt met de scale discriminatie van in-the-money opties, dan is het model
consistent met het bijna uniform gebruik van at-the-money aandeel opties.
In hoofdstuk 3 en hoofdstuk 4, gebruiken we een unieke kalibratie aanpak die een
minimale aantal parameter aannamen nodig heeft en maakt het model passend voor elke CEO
in de steekproef - en niet alleen de gemiddelde. De kalibratie aanpak overbrugt de kloof tussen
theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek naar de beloning van bestuurders en stelt ons in staat om
de kwantitatieve (en niet alleen de kwalitatieve) implicaties van de verschillende modellen te
testen. Bovendien draagt deze aanpak bij aan de empirische literatuur over vergoedingen voor
de CEOs omdat dit het endogeniteit probleem omzeilt dat aandeelhouders tegelijkertijd stevige
risico en management prikkels bepalen wanneer zij de vergoedingen in contracten ontwerpen,
wiens endogeniteit we modelleren en de voorspellingen van dit model testen. Een andere bijdrage
aan de empirische literatuur is een nieuwe maatregel van (anti) prikkels die de risico voorkeuren
van managers combineert met de vorm van zijn vergoedingencontract en datgene wat we noemen
risico vermijdend. Het meet de gewenste winstgevendheid welke een extra risicovol project
moet overschrijden, om te worden aangenomen door de CEO. De mediaan risicovermijding is in
onze steekproef is 1,25 voor een risico-mijdende parameter van 2.
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